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ABSTRACT  
 
This study focuses on bank liquidity creation as a comprehensive measure of all bank’s on 
and off balance sheet activities, and it specially formulates and tests the hypothesis which 
address the issue as to whether high total bank liquidity creation has a positive effect on 
systemic risk. Using a sample of large US commercial banks from 2000 to 2014, this study 
finds that there is a positive association between liquidity creation and systemic risk. After 
the Berger and Bouwman’s (2009) preferred liquidity creation is decomposed into its two 
main components, the results suggest that on balance sheet liquidity creation has no 
significant effect on the level of systemic risk, while off balance sheet liquidity creation 
strongly positively contributes to systemic risk. These results demonstrate that off balance 
sheet liquidity creation is the main component for explaining the cross-sectional variation in 
the level of systemic risk. The empirical findings also indicate that liquidity creation, 
especially its off balance component, has a stronger positive effect on systemic risk during 
the financial crisis in 2008. 
 
 
 
KEYWORDS: Liquidity creation, systemic risk, financial crisis, bank risk-taking. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The recent financial crisis has been the most adverse crisis since the great depression in 
1930s, and many banks all around the world have been involved in intriguing the turmoil. 
The recent crisis showed how a negative shock to a financial institution can propagate from 
one country to another, and trigger financial instability. It also emphasized that the aggregate 
risk in the financial market is more important than firm stand-alone risk (Anginer, Demirguc-
Kunt & Zhu. 2014).  
 
In the aftermath of global financial crisis, the concept of systemic risk gained important place 
in economic policy debates as well as among academia. The concern about systemic risk has 
led to the foundation of important organizations in the United State and Europe. In 2010, 
Financial Stability Oversight Council and European Systemic Risk Board were founded to 
identify and monitor systemic risk as well as providing financial stability and constraining 
the buildup of excessive risk in the system.  
 
It is important for bank regulators and supervisors to analyze the determinants of bank’s 
attributes contributing to systemic risk. Such understandings can help not only to develop 
available systemic risk measure, but it can also help to improve early warning indicators. In 
addition, this information can help regulators to develop an optimal taxation policy where 
the tax is levied according to bank’s contribution to systemic risk. 
 
In the past few years, many researchers have been trying to find a new way of measuring 
systemic risk, however, there are few literatures focusing on bank specific characteristics 
affecting systemic risk. The investigation on bank specific attributes influencing the level of 
systemic risk is the main motivation of this study. In this regard, the relationship between 
systemic risk and liquidity creation as one of the main characteristics of commercial and 
depository banks is investigated. This study aims to extend the growing body of previous 
literature by examining whether liquidity creation as a good way of measuring bank output 
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affects the level of systemic risk. Therefore, this study aims to fill the gap between these two 
strands of literature by testing and formulating this hypothesis.  
 
Perhaps the most closely related paper to this study is the recent work by Berger and 
Bouwman (2010) who demonstrate that high liquidity creation is a good indicator for 
predicting a future financial crisis. After detrending, deseasonalizing the liquidity creation 
and controlling for different macroeconomic factors, Berger and Bouwman (2010) show that 
aggregate liquidity creation has been abnormally high before banking crises (credit crisis of 
1990–1992 and subprime mortgage crisis in 2007). Using logit regressions, they find that 
when on and off balance sheet liquidity creation (total liquidity creation) is relatively high, 
there is a high tendency for a financial crisis occurrence. Their evidence especially stresses 
on the important role of off balance sheet liquidity creation for predicting a future financial 
crisis. However, this study examines high liquidity creation in the context of systemic risk.  
 
Another related study is Mayordomo, Rodriguez-Moreno, and Peña (2014) who investigate 
bank’s holding of derivatives on systemic risk. They use different off balance sheet items, in 
particular derivatives, and find that bank’s aggregate holding derivatives do not have any 
significant effect on systemic risk. Although they examine some parts of bank’s off balance 
sheet activities such as derivatives (not guarantees), they did not account for the total off 
balance sheet activities. Therefore, accounting for the total bank’s off balance activities 
distinguishes this work from Mayordomo’s et al. (2014). 
 
Consistent with the studies by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) and Pais, and Stork (2013) 
who argue that large banks contribute the most to systemic risk, this study focuses on the 
large US commercial banks to investigate the relationship between liquidity creation and 
systemic risk. More importantly, large US financial institutions are labeled as “Too-Big-to-
Fail” which poses a systemic thread to the financial market. Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission (2011: 298–386) argues that after the recent financial meltdown the financial 
system has become more intertwined than before, and it emphasizes the important role of 
large financial institutions in the stability of financial system. Another reason for choosing 
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large US banks is that large commercial banks create most of liquidity in the banking sector 
(81%), however, they constitute a negligible fraction (2%) of total banks in the US (Berger 
& Bouwman 2009).  
 
The main findings of this study are as follows. First total liquidity creation is positively 
associated with systemic risk. Second, additional sets of panel regressions are run according 
to on and off balance sheet liquidity creation to further examine whether the main finding is 
driven by on balance sheet liquidity, off balance sheet liquidity creation or both. The analyses 
suggest that the effect of off balance sheet liquidity creation is positively associated with 
systemic risk, while on balance sheet liquidity creation has no significant effect on the level 
of systemic risk. The latter finding indicates that off balance sheet liquidity creation is the 
main component for explaining the cross-sectional variation in the level of systemic risk. 
Said differently, the significant effect of total liquidity creation which supports the hypothesis 
is driven primarily by off balance sheet component of liquidity creation. Finally, the 
empirical findings also suggest that there is a positive strong association between systemic 
risk and total liquidity creation as well as on and off balance sheet liquidity creation during 
the 2008 financial crisis. 
 
 
1.1. Purpose of the study 
 
The main purpose of this study is to empirically examine if liquidity creation as a measure 
of bank core activity influences the level of systemic risk. The reason for choosing liquidity 
creation is that it is not only the main function of commercial and depository banks, but it is 
also important for economic growth (Berger & Sedunov 2015; Fidrmuc, Fungacova, & Weill 
2015).  
 
This study conjectures that high total liquidity creation positively contributes to systemic risk 
for several reasons. First, the trigger of the financial crisis was due to an increase in subprime 
mortgages. Berger and Bouwman (2008) argue that high liquidity creation in the banking 
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sector was followed by 2007 subprime crisis mainly resulted from loose lending standards. 
These relaxed lending standards before the crisis allowed banks to extend credits and 
especially their off balance sheet activities.  
 
Second, not only does high liquidity creation encourage bank risk taking, but it also leads to 
an increase in the probability of bank failure (see Acharya & Naqvi 2012; Fungacova, Turk 
& Weill 2015). Furthermore, Diamond and Dybving (1983) document that liquidity creation 
causes banks to be fragile to bank run, and this bank run can lead to a financial crisis through 
bank contagion. In addition to Diamond and Dybving’s (1983) study,  Berger and Bouwman 
(2009) also highlight the importance of high liquidity creation as a predictor of a financial 
crisis. 
 
Third, Berger and Bouwman (2008) argue that high off balance sheet activities such as loan 
commitments can “sow the seed of crisis”, and they argue that high liquidity created by banks 
leads to the financial instability. Last but not least, Foos , Norden , and Weber (2010) find 
that a growth in bank loan increases the riskiness of banks which can be used by supervisors 
as an early warning indicator. One can also argue that as the major activity of banks (liquidity 
creation) increases, banks put not only themselves at risk but the whole financial system, 
because they make themselves more illiquid by creating liquidity for the public. 
 
Motivated by the evidence found in the aforementioned papers, the linkage between liquidity 
creation and systemic risk is investigated in this study. In this regard, systemic risk measure 
(SRISK) proposed by Brownless and Engle (2011) is employed as the systemic risk measure. 
Also, the amount of liquidity created by commercial banks is calculated using Berger and 
Bouwman’s (2009) approach. This study uses Berger and Bouwman’s (2009) preferred 
liquidity creation measure which accounts for both on and off balance sheet bank activities. 
They call their favorable measure ‘catfat’, and this measure classifies the loan according to 
the information merely on product category.  Also, in order to investigate whether the 
significant effect of liquidity creation is caused by its off balance liquidity creation, on 
balance liquidity creation or both, catfat measure is decomposed into its two components.  
15 
 
1.2. Research hypothesis and contribution 
 
This thesis formulates and tests the hypothesis postulating that high total liquidity creation 
has a positive contribution to systemic risk. In line with this hypothesis, Berger and 
Bouwman (2008) find that prior to the banking crises the aggregate liquidity creation has 
been abnormally high, and they argue that banking crises occur following an “abnormal” 
positive liquidity creation. The importance of off balance sheet liquidity creation has been 
highlighted in several studies (see for example Berger & Bouwman 2009, 2010; Thakor 
2005), thus this thesis accounts for on and off balance sheet creation of liquidity. 
  
This study aims to fill the gap between two strands of literature, namely, liquidity creation 
and systemic risk, by empirically examining whether high liquidity creation can explain the 
cross-sectional variation in the level of systemic risk. Although the recent study by Acharya 
and Thakor (2015) stresses that high leverage as an instrument of liquidity creation increases 
bank risk taking, there is not any previous study examining the relationship between liquidity 
creation and systemic risk. To my knowledge, this is the first attempt to empirically examine 
this linkage. As a result, this study contributes to the growing body of literature on factors 
that affect systemic risk. This research also sheds light on the understanding of determinants 
of a bank’s contribution to the systemic risk. The main hypothesis of this study is of the 
following form: 
 
H1 = High total liquidity creation contributes positively to systemic risk.  
 
 
1.3. Structure of the study 
 
The study is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses previous related studies. Section 3 
presents the definition of systemic risk, and section 4 provides two types of systemic risk 
failure. Sections 5 and 6 discuss how SRISK is calculated. Section 7 presents the construction 
of liquidity creation measure. Section 8 describes data and methodology. Section 9 reports 
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the empirical results. Section 10 provides the empirical results for the two components of 
total liquidity creation. Section 11 investigates the robustness of the main finding that 
supports the hypothesis. Section 12 concludes the study. 
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2. PREVIOUS RELATED STUDIES 
 
This study is closely related to two strands of literature, namely, systemic risk and liquidity 
creation. Although there are various ways to measure systemic risk, there are few studies on 
bank specific characteristics influencing systemic risk. According to the previous studies, 
size of financial institutions, non-interest income, financial derivatives, banks competition, 
the amount of leverage, good corporate governance, and non-performing loans are some of 
the factors affecting systemic risk. 
 
Brunnermeier, Dong, and Palia (2012) use the non-interest income to interest income ratio 
as a proxy for shadow banking system. They find a positive association between non-
traditional banking activities and systemic risk. Non-interest income ties to non-traditional 
banking such as income from securitization, while interest income accounts for traditional 
banking activities such as deposit taking and lending. Although previous study by 
Brunnermeier et al. (2012) differentiates between two different banking activities, namely, 
interest and non-interest incomes, they only employ a limited information on bank output 
using income statement of commercial banks.  
 
In addition, Mayordomo et al. (2014) use off balance sheet items, in particular derivatives, 
and they find that among various types of derivatives, foreign exchange and credit derivatives 
have a positive association with systemic risk, while interest rate derivatives have a negative 
association. They also demonstrate that non-performing loans and leverage ratio have even 
larger effects on the level of systemic risk than derivatives.  
 
The previous findings also emphasize on the role of leverage as a double-edged sword. While 
high leverage increases market discipline, it can also cause market fragility.  At individual 
bank level and micro-prudential level, Diamond and Rajan (1999), through a theoretical 
framework, show that leverage increases market discipline and liquidity creation through 
improving loan quality.  They argue that leverage allows the bank manager to enhance the 
liquidity creation by choosing better asset classes. In contrast, the recent financial crisis 
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highlighted that an increase in leverage led to the fragility of financial institutions. The reason 
is that high leverage involves financial institutions in risky assets (illiquid loans) choice and 
widespread security activities which cause collective and aggregate fragility of banks.  
 
Previous studies by Adrian and Shin (2010), Goel, Song and Thakor (2014), and Shleifer and 
Vishny (2010a) document the role of high leverage in the recent financial crisis. Adrian and 
Shin (2010) find that leverage is procycilcal and positively related to the size of balance sheet. 
They argue that bank leverage is high during market boom and relatively low during market 
distress.  This feature of leverage can clearly be seen when the balance sheet is actively 
updated to the recent change in market price. Furthermore, Shleifer and Vishny (2010a) 
propose a stylized model which shows how leverage leads to financial instability.  
 
In addition to the aforementioned studies, Acharya and Thakor (2015) develop a theoretical 
framework which shows a positive association between leverage-based liquidity creation and 
systemic risk. Unlike Diamond and Rajan’s (1999) study which only allows leverage to 
discipline the bank manager for generating liquidity, Acharya et al. (2015) use equity and 
leverage to discipline the bank manager for liquidity creation. This model enables them to 
link between micro-prudential and macro-prudential objectives. In their model, there is a 
difference between using leverage and equity in generating liquidity. While leverage 
increases the liquidity creation, the equity has a reduction role. The reason is that the bank 
manager needs to make a payment from ex-post cash flow to financiers if they use equity as 
a way of financing, whereas leverage does not need any cash flow to be foregone. Acharya 
et al. (2015) also show that while each levered financial institution increases discipline in the 
market, it can also enhance the aggregate systemic risk. They argue that a negative aspect of 
leverage as an instrument of liquidity creation is that it contributes positively to the systemic 
risk, indicating that high leverage increases the exposure to systemic risk. 
 
Good corporate governance is another factor influencing systemic risk. The recent study by 
Iqbal, Strobl and Vähämaa (2015) shows that there is a positive relationship between strong 
corporate governance mechanism and the level of systemic risk especially during the 
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financial crisis. They demonstrate that those financial institutions which protect shareholders 
right and have good corporate governance practices contribute positively to systemic risk. 
The reason is that these financial institutions similar to any other firms aim to maximize 
shareholder value. In order to satisfy their shareholders before the financial crisis, these firms 
might increase their profitability by taking excess risk. They also argue that good corporate 
mechanism is not always beneficial for institutions, since good corporate practices can 
encourage the financial institutions to take risk excessively.  
 
Pais, and Stork (2013) analyze the effect of size of financial institutions on individual bank 
risk as well as systemic risk. Pais, and Stork (2013) find that larger banks have a greater 
effect on the aggregate level of systemic risk. However, the impact of bank size on stand-
alone bank risk is not huge. After the recent global financial crisis, policymakers and 
regulators realized the prominent role of large financial institutions in financial contagion. 
That is why the recent reforms adopted in banking regulation paid more attention to large 
and highly interconnected financial institutions.  
 
In addition, Anginer et al. (2014) investigate the linkage between bank competition and 
systemic risk. They find that bank competition and systemic risk are negatively corrected to 
one another, suggesting that high competition in the banking sector can lead to more stable 
financial system. They also demonstrate that the baking system is instable either in countries 
in which they have more state-owned banks, or in countries in which they have policies 
constraining competition amidst banks. In order to tackle instability problem in the banking 
sector, they argue that stronger institutional environment should be established in these 
countries. Anginer et al. (2014) also argue that higher competition among banks not only 
leads to larger innovation and better quality of financial products in the banking sector, but 
it also leads to financial stability. Furthermore, they believe that as the competition increases 
in the banking sector, banks are encouraged to diversify their risk, and thus they are more 
stable to negative externalities.  
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In addition to the literature focusing on factors affecting systemic risk, this study is also 
closely related to the literature on liquidity creation. Financial intermediation theory 
considers liquidity creation as one of the most crucial roles of banks. Bhattacharya and 
Thakor (1993) discuss the reasons why financial intermediaries exist. They also discuss bank 
liquidity transformation and maturity transformation as one of the key issues in the banking 
theory. Furthermore, they show how banks improve capital and credit allocations in the 
economy. Even a long time ago, Adam Smith (1776) emphasizes the important role of banks 
in generating liquidity. Smith (1776: II.2.41) discusses this role of banks and he states “That 
the trade and industry of Scotland, however, have increased very considerably during this 
period, and that the banks have contributed a good deal to this increase, cannot be doubted.”.  
 
Liquidity created by banks has also an important role in economic growth (see e.g. 
Bencivenga & Smith 1991; Berger & Sedunov 2015; Fidrmuc, Fungacova, & Weill 2015). 
For example, Berger and Sedunov (2015) show that there is a positive relationship between 
liquidity creation and GDP, and they document that liquidity creation has larger effects on 
economic growth than any other bank services.  
 
Liquidity created by banks can also improve welfare in society and has an important 
implication in macro-economy (e.g, Bernanke 1983; Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache, & Rajan 
2008). For instance, Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan, (2008) demonstrate that the 
banking sector distress has an exogenous negative effect on economic activities, suggesting 
that during a financial distress real economy suffers the most when it heavily depends on the 
banking sector. Their finding suggests that a banking crisis causes economic distress and not 
vice versa, because distressed banks can decrease bank lending to the real economy. In other 
words, a banking crisis has severe and devastating effects on the economic activities.  
 
Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer, (2009) also highlight the crucial role of liquidity creation 
during the crisis. They show that bank’s choice of liquidity or their portfolio is 
countercyclical, suggesting that banks tend to hold liquid assets during a financial distress 
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and risky or illiquid assets during a market boom. The reason is that if banks have enough 
high liquid resources during a market distress, they benefit from potential fire sale gains.   
 
According to liquidity creation theory, banks create liquidity for both depositors and 
borrowers on and off balance sheet. On the one hand, depositors withdraw funds on demand 
because they are uncertain about the time of consumption. Therefore, banks are obliged to 
provide liquidity for them if depositors demand. On the other hand, banks originate illiquid 
loans for borrowers as well. Therefore, liquidity creation enhances the allocation of credit 
and capital in the economy.  
 
Traditionally liquidity can be created on the balance sheet of banks by financing illiquid 
assets (illiquid loans) with liquid liabilities (deposits) (Bryant 1980; Diamond & Dybvig 
1983). According to liquidity creation theory, banks create liquidity for the public when they 
transform an illiquid claim such as a long term loan to a liquid claim such as a demand 
deposit. Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) model focuses on the liability side of balance sheet. 
They argue that withdrawal risk or a bank run is one of the risks that banks face as a liquidity 
creator when they are financed with liquid deposits, and banks can eliminate this risk through 
federal deposit insurance. In addition, they propose a model showing that if banks are able to 
keep liquid deposit claims, this would improve welfare in society. The recent study by 
Donaldson, Piacentino and Thakor (2016) highlights the role of banks as on and off balance 
sheet liquidity creators. Through their model they show that as the assets become more 
illiquid, the amount of liquidity created by banks increases. In other words, when banks focus 
more on the asset side of balance sheet, they give out more loans which in return increase the 
investment in the economy. 
 
Banks can also create liquidity off their balance sheet for depositors and customers via loan 
commitments or other kinds of claims such as standby letters of credit (see e.g. Boot, 
Greenbaum, & Thakor 1993; Holmstrom & Tirole 1998; Kashyap, Rajan, & Stein 2002; 
Thakor 2005). Kashyap et al. (2002) illustrate how banks are able to create liquidity off their 
balance sheet. They argue that, on the one hand, banks consider loan commitments as illiquid 
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assets, due to the fact that the bank needs to provide funding to their customers in the future 
if demanded. On the other hand, customers consider loan commitments similar to demand 
deposits because loan commitments enable them to withdraw funds at any time during the 
life of the contract. As a result, according to liquidity creation theory, banks create liquidity 
off their balance sheet by keeping illiquid claims and provide liquid claims for the public. 
Kashyap et al. (2002) also argue that provided that there is an imperfect negative correlation 
between commitment lending and deposit withdrawals, these two bank activities can work 
well together, and thus, banks take advantage of involving in these two functions as a 
liquidity creator.  
  
In parallel, Thakor (2005) proposes a theoretical model in which loan commitments are 
considered as an instruments of off balance sheet liquidity creation as well as an instrument 
against future credit rationing by banks. He shows how loan commitments change bank 
lending behaviors during the market distress and market boom. He finds that during the 
market boom and when the interest rate is low, the supply of credit increases inefficiently 
which results in over-lending by banks.  
 
In addition, Allen and Gale (2004) develop a theoretical framework arguing that incomplete 
contracts offered by banks such as demand deposits increase bank default. Consequently, one 
can argue that liquidity can be seen as a channel through which contagion can propagate. In 
parallel, previous study by Fungacova et al. (2015) shows that high liquidity creation leads 
to an increase in the probability of bank failure. They argue that those banks with high 
liquidity creation are more likely to fail than other banks, and thus banks whose liquidity 
creation proliferates are more fragile.  
 
It has been also shown that bank liquidity creation tied with an increase in the risk exposure. 
Acharya and Naqvi (2012) develop a stylized model showing that excess bank liquidity 
encourages the bank manager to take excess risk by underpricing downside risk. They explain 
how bank lending behaviors cause the recent financial crisis when the bank liquidity was 
high. In their model, deposits collected from savers and investors are the main determinants 
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of bank liquidity. After collecting the deposits, a fraction of them are set aside as reserves 
and the rest of the collected deposits are given out as loans. On the one hand, in banks, when 
the loan officers’ compensations are tied to higher volume of loans, they try to give out loans 
excessively to increase their compensations. This volume-based compensation in banks leads 
to underpriced downside risk. On the other hand, when there is a high tendency for 
macroeconomic risk, investors search for safe securities, and eventually, they deposit their 
money in the bank which increases the bank liquidity. As the bank is flooded with liquidity, 
managers are easing lending standards and mispricing the downside risk. This aggressive 
behavior leads to an increase in bank risk-taking, as well as an asset price bubble. They also 
argue that their model has a “leaning against liquidity approach” and the central banks should 
tighten the monetary policy when bank liquidity is excessively high. 
 
One can also argue that low interest rates can increase bank liquidity creation, and then this 
rise in liquidity creation can result in an increase in bank risk taking by selling abundant 
illiquid long term loans. The 2008 financial crisis provided ample evidence for this 
arguments. In 2003, the Fed decreased the interest rate unprecedentedly to 1% which was the 
lowest amount since 1958. This expansionary monetary policy allowed bank to become 
involved in over-lending as well as increased liquidity creation. As discussed before, high 
liquidity creation could encourage bank managers to increase their actual risk positions by 
mispricing the downside risk of investment projects before the recent financial crisis. 
 
Consistent with the aforementioned argument, Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marques-Ibanez 
(2010) analyze the linkage between the low interest rates as a way of implementing 
expansionary monetary policy and bank risk-taking. They find that over a long period of time 
a low interest rate leads to an increase in bank risk-taking. In parallel, a previous study by 
Berger and Bouwman (2010) shows that a loose monitory policy affects liquidity created by 
medium and small size banks, while this effect is ambiguous for large banks in normal times. 
They also report that a loose monitory policy has a weaker influence on banks of any size 
during the financial crisis, meaning that it is less effective during the financial distress. This 
24 
 
discussion on liquidity creation and bank risk-taking would justify that main hypothesis of 
this study.  
 
The recent global financial crisis also stressed the importance of off-balance sheet bank 
activities which mostly occurred through securitization process in the shadow banking 
system. These activities deviated banks from traditional banking system and emphasized the 
importance of off-balance sheet liquidity created by banks. Hence, in the past few years, on 
and off balance sheet activities have been indispensable. Berger and Bouwman (2008) argue 
that the recent financial crisis was followed by a high liquidity creation in the banking sector 
and they stress the role of off balance sheet liquidity creation in intriguing the turmoil.  
 
The rise in bank’s off balance sheet activities are closely related to moving banks from 
traditional banking (originate to hold model) towards non-traditional banking (originate to 
distribute model). Thus, originate to hold (OTH) and originate to distribute (OTD) models 
are the main two models in the banking sector. The OTH model focuses on relationship 
lending. According to the definition proposed by Boot (2000), the relationship banking is 
“the provision of financial services by a financial intermediary that: invests in obtaining 
customer-specific information, often proprietary in nature, and evaluates the profitability of 
these investments through multiple interactions with the same customer over time and/or 
across products”. In this model, banks hold illiquid loans they make on their balance sheet 
until they mature. Upfront screening and regular monitoring are the advantages of the OTH 
model which reduces the bank moral hazard.  
 
In the OTD model, banks can also create liquidity by making loans that are eventually 
securitized or sold. The OTD model enables banks to remove the loans from their balance 
sheet. Through selling loans or, in particular, securitization, banks no longer need to keep the 
loans on their balance sheet until maturity, instead they can free up capital by selling the 
loans to SPV and use the extra capital to generate new loans. While some papers highlight 
the advantage of securitization as one of the components of OTD model, others stress the 
downside of it. Among these studies, Aghion, Bolton, and Tirole (2004) illustrate that 
25 
 
securitization reduces upfront screening by banks because the loans can proceed to other 
banks. In addition, Thakor (2005) and Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) report that during 
the economic boom, this problem worsens, and banks decrease their lending standards which 
lead to an increase in financial instability.  Consequently, as bank lending standards 
aggravate, banks are able to originate more loans and make themselves illiquid while creating 
liquidity for borrowers and customers. Figure 1 compares securitization in the shadow 
banking and traditional banking.  
 
 
Figure 1. Originate-to-Hold (OTH) versus Originate-to-Distribute (OTD) Model. 
 
  
Note: Source: Liquidity: How Banks Create It and How It Should Be Regulated. Bouwman (2013:47) 
Forthcoming in the oxford handbook of banking. 
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Banks began adopting the OTD model in their business model by either selling their loans or 
syndicating loans. Recently, banks have engaged in distributing their loans by creating 
collateralized loan obligations (CLOs). As a result, the OTH model is gradually replaced with 
the OTD model, due to a substantial growth in syndicating loans and CLOs. A previous study 
by Bord and Santos (2012) shows that lead banks have gradually changed their business 
model from the OTH to the OTD in corporate lending in the past 25 years. Bord and Santos 
(2012) report that the amount of loans trading in the secondary market soared from $8 billion 
in 1991 to more than $176 billion by 2005. In addition, they also document that the amount 
of loans in the syndicated market had a significant growth from $339 billion in 1988 to $2.2 
trillion in 2007, indicating a quintuple increase.  
 
One can argue that changing the business model from the OTH to the OTD can be one reason 
for a fast increase in liquidity creation in recent years. Consistent with this issue, Berger and 
Bouwman (2010) document that the liquidity creation has increased over time between 1984 
and 2008. However, off balance sheet liquidity creation exceeded on balance sheet liquidity 
creation in mid-1990s when shadow banking started to rise, and since then it increased faster 
than ever before. Figure 2 shows the amount of liquidity created by commercial and credit 
card banks in the US between 1984 and 2008. This figure also splits the liquidity creation 
into its on and off balance sheet components. As can be seen, liquidity creation has soared 
from $1.4 trillion in 1984 to $5.3 trillion in 2008, indicating a quadruple increase. Besides, 
the off balance sheet liquidity created by banks has played a crucial role in total liquidity 
created by banks. In addition, they show that large banks create a substantial amount of 
liquidity in the banking sector (figure 3). As can be seen from figure 3, the amount of liquidity 
created by large banks has risen from 76% in 1984 to over 86% in 2008, while it has 
negligibly decreased for medium and small size banks in this period. 
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Figure 2. Liquidity created by US banks from 1984 to 2008. 
 
Note: Source: Bank Liquidity Creation, Monetary Policy, and Financial Crisis. Berger and Bouwman 
(2010: 37). 
 
 
Figure 3. Liquidity created by large, medium and small banks in the US. 
 
Note: Source: Bank Liquidity Creation, Monetary Policy, and Financial Crisis. Berger and Bouwman 
(2010: 37). 
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3. SYSTEMIC RISK 
 
This section first presents the definition of systemic risk according to the Global Financial 
Stability Report of the IMF. Then the problem of “too-big-too-fail” (TBTF) moral hazard 
and systemic risk as well as the definition of a TBTF firm are presented. Finally, the second 
subsection is concluded by the definition of systematically important financial institutions 
(SIFIs). 
 
 
3.1. The definition of systemic risk 
 
The importance of interconnectivity among financial institutions in either creating systemic 
risk or triggering financial instability was deeply realized after the occurrence of financial 
crisis in 2008 (see e.g. Plosser 2009; Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011).  Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011: 298–386) discusses how over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivative markets trigger the risk of contagion and interconnectivity in the financial system. 
They also argue that the intertwined structure of financial system is more concentrated 
especially after the occurrence of the financial crisis due to broad mergers and accusations 
during the financial distress. As a result, large and important financial institutions now play 
even more significant role in the stability of financial system. This market concentration 
raises special attention to regulators and policymakers for regulating the SIFIs. 
 
After the recent global financial meltdown, the concept of systemic risk gained important 
place among researchers and regulators all over the world, as it showed how a negative shock 
to a financial institution can propagate the risk from one country to another, and trigger 
financial instability. In 2009, the Global Financial Stability Report of the IMF presented a 
well-defined and useful definition of systemic risk: 
“a risk of disruption to financial services that is caused by an impairment of all or parts of the 
financial system and that has the potential to cause serious negative consequences for the real 
economy” 
29 
 
There is a schizophrenic view about the role of intertwined financial system. While some 
researchers believe that the tight interconnectivity among financial institutions strengthens 
the efficiency of financial system, some argue that it also increases the financial instability 
by increasing the risk of spill-over to the rest of economy. Among the proponent of 
intertwined financial system, Allen and Gale (2000) argue that more interconnected financial 
system has the ability to absorb losses, since the losses can be absorbed by more 
counterparties in the network. In contrast, Vivier-Lirimont (2006) argues that more 
interconnected financial network leads to financial instability due to the fact that as the 
number of counterparties which are connected to the distressed bank increases, they can 
spread the contagion faster into the financial system. In a more complete view, Acemoglu, 
Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015) demonstrate that interconnectivity amidst financial 
institutions can lead to financial stability if a small negative shock affects a financial 
institution. In other words, small negative shocks can be absorbed in an interconnected 
financial system, and thus interconnectivity leads to the efficiency of financial system. 
Nonetheless, large negative shocks beyond a certain limit lead to financial fragility, and the 
interconnectivity among financial institutions acts as a mechanism to spread the financial 
contagion.  
 
Kaufman (1994: 126) analyzes the financial contagion and he identifies important stylized 
facts about the financial contagion in the banking sector which can be obviously seen from 
the definition of systemic risk presented by IMF.   One of the stylized facts that Kaufman 
(1994) identifies is that financial contagion spreads faster and causes serious damage to the 
real economy. The reason is that the real economy heavily depends upon financial services, 
and if the financial system collapses, the real economy cannot survive. As a result, when the 
whole function of financial sector is curtailed, the whole economy is subjected to a halt.  
 
 
3.2. Too-Big-to-Fail (TBTF) moral hazard and systemic risk 
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Systemic risk is closely tied to the size of financial institutions. As discussed in previous 
literature section, Pais, and Stork (2011) find that larger banks have a larger effect on the 
aggregate level of systemic risk. The reason comes from the moral hazard generated by the 
TBTF problem, and it has been one of the main drivers of the recent financial crisis (e.g. 
Bernanke 2010; Acharya & Richardson 2009; Stern & Feldman 2004; Financial Stability 
Board (FSB) 2010). For example, Financial Stability Board (2010) discusses potential 
measures to address TBTF problems concerning large and SIFIs to reduce the likelihood of 
bailouts by the government. In addition, Acharya and Richardson (2009: 32–35) propose a 
solution for addressing a moral hazard of TBTF problem in creating systemic risk. They 
argue that each financial institution’s contribution to systemic risk should be priced and then 
an optimal taxation should be levied. Bernanke (2010), the chairman of Federal Reserve, 
defines the TBTF firm as follows: 
“A too-big-to-fail firm is one whose size, complexity, interconnectedness, and critical functions are 
such that, should the firm go unexpectedly into liquidation, the rest of the financial system and the 
economy would face severe adverse consequences.” 
 
Stern and Feldman (2004: 43–59) argue that financial firms are treated differently by the 
government than other firms due to the fact that they are more likely to trigger financial 
instability if they fail. Stern and Feldman (2004: 17–19) also discuss that when financial firms 
know that they are privileged by the government in consequence of their failure, they are 
reluctant to invest resources to monitor their risk-taking behaviors, and thus, the firms change 
their risk-taking behavior because of the TBTF protection. They also believe that the cost of 
protecting TBTF firms outweighs its benefits, and it increases the probability of a financial 
crisis. In parallel, Acharya and Richardson (2009: 27–28) also argue that TBTF pushes 
financial institutions into innovated ways to take advantage of unregulated risk-taking. For 
instance, banks use the structured investment vehicle (SIV), which is unregulated, to take 
excess risk and keep their assets off-balance sheet. In this way, the bank is not only exempt 
from the capital requirement regulation, but they are also developed easily in the financial 
sector.  
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As policymakers and regulators realized the importance of contribution of large financial 
institutions to systemic risk, new requirements were introduced by Basel Committee for 
SIFIs to reduce the moral hazard caused by the TBTF problem (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision 2011; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2013). This requirement has 
been taken place in order to prevent the probability of financial contagion and improve the 
ability of banks in absorbing losses. According to Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo 
(2009), a systematically important financial institution is defined as: 
 
“Financial institutions are systemically important if the failure of the firm to meet its obligations to 
creditors and customers would have significant adverse consequences for the financial system and 
the broader economy.”. 
 
According to this definition, a failure of a SIFI not only causes severe damage to the financial 
system, but it also causes adverse effects on the real economy. Therefore, a collapse of a SIFI 
is one of the key drivers of systemic risk. The role of SIFIs in the financial contagion makes 
regulators to monitor them closely in respect to their risk-taking behavior. The reason is that 
if such financial institutions fail to meet their obligations, the government has to step in and 
rescue them with taxpayers’ money. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, many 
governments all over the world faced the question of whether or not they have to rescue these 
firms. This is the question that no government officials would like to face in the future. That 
is why they attempt to build a regulatory environment where financial institutions are unable 
to take excess risk.  
 
The rescue of a bank by government causes the costs on society, and in particular on 
taxpayers. The reason is that the taxpayers are the ones who provide resources for implicit 
government guarantees for bank’s debt if the bank fails. In 2012, a joint letter was written by 
12 leaders to president Van Rompuy and president Barroso claiming that “Implicit 
guarantees to always rescue banks, which distort the single market, should be reduced. 
Banks, not taxpayers, should be responsible for bearing the costs of the risks they take.”. 
That is why after the recent financial crisis, it has been tried to build a regulatory environment 
in order to make it less likely for government to rescue financial firms with taxpayers’ money.  
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Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010: 13–16) propose an optimal taxation 
policy according to marginal expected shortfall (MES) in order that the firm internalizes their 
systemic risk to the rest of economy. In this taxation system, a tax is levied based on the 
firm’s contribution to systemic risk as well as the losses in debt guaranteed by government. 
These guarantees can be too-big-to-fail (an implicit guarantee) or deposit insurance (an 
explicit guarantee) which are not properly priced. 
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4. THE COMPLEX NATURE OF SYSTEMIC RISK 
 
This section presents two types of systemic failure, namely, contagion and a common shock, 
identified by Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011: 431–433). In the first subsection 
domino effect is discussed and in the second subsection fire section is presented in brief. 
 
4.1. Domino effect or Contagion 
 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011: 431–432) describes contagion as a “flue” where 
it can contaminate other financial institutions and spread the sickness through a direct 
connection via counterparties. For instance, if there is a direct connection between two 
financial firms, and one of them fails, there is a high tendency that the other one is also fails. 
Previous work by Markwat, Kole, and Dijk (2009) shows that contagion acts as a domino 
effect in a financial market. In particular, they demonstrate that the risk of contagion spreads 
from local to reginal and then global if a stock market crashes. Also, the severity of the 
contagion propagates from one market to another.  
 
 
4.2. Fire sale or a common shock 
 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011: 432–433) describes a common factor as a “food 
poisoning” where unconnected small, mid-size and large financial institutions are influenced 
by it in the same way and at nearly the same time. In this regard, a failure of a financial 
institution can be considered as an early indicator or a warning flag, and it does not 
necessarily lead to the failure of other financial institutions in the financial system. However, 
an analysis of the recent global financial crisis by Shleifer and Vishny (2010b) shows that 
the fire sale has played a crucial role in the recent financial meltdown through depleting the 
balance sheet of financial institutions and triggering the risk of contagion. In other words, the 
fire sale of assets acted as a common factor when losses on the housing securities and other 
types of assets started at roughly the same time and affected small, mid-size and large 
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unconnected firms as well. They also link fire sales to macroeconomic factors and show that 
how the weakened balance sheet of financial institutions decreases the financial output and 
investment. In the fire sale of an asset, a troubled firm has to sell its assets with a significant 
reduction in value, this sharp reduction in the price forces the prices of similar assets which 
are held by other firms to go down. As a result, a severe decline in the price starts a financial 
distress. 
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5. SYSTEMIC RISK MEASUREMENT 
 
This section discusses the theoretical parts of the systemic risk measure which is employed 
in this study. First, SRISK proposed by Brownlees and Engle (2011) and stress test are 
compared as they have the same goal. Next, a simple and widely used measure of systemic 
risk, namely, expected shortfall, (ES) is reviewed. Then, since SRISK is built upon Acharya, 
Pedersen, Philippon and Richardson’s (2010) work, the pivotal components of Acharya’s et 
al. (2010) theoretical analysis framework is presented and SRISK is finally presented.  
 
 
5.1. Stress test versus systemic risk (SRISK) 
 
One of the tools which has been used by supervisory officials for a long time is stress testing. 
In the stress test a question can be raised as to if the economy weakens in a particular way, 
how much capital would a firm requires. Stress tests determine the amount of capital a 
financial institution needs during a financial crisis by looking at the balance sheets and 
functioning of the financial institutions. However, the depth and severity of the recent 
financial crisis showed that there are many weaknesses in the stress testing practices, since 
these tests were not able to detect undercapitalized financial institutions before the financial 
crisis (Basel committee on banking supervision 2009). However, Brownlees and Engle 
(2011) propose a market-based approach which has the same goal as stress tests. They use 
publically available information which are accessible for everyone. This systemic risk 
measure estimates the capital shortfall in a crisis, and therefore, it is a good substitute for the 
stress test which literally measures the amount of capital a financial institution needs during 
a financial crisis. According to their work, if the stress is designed to reflect a future financial 
crisis, then the goal is to measure the equation 1. 
 
(1)   𝐸𝑡−1(𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖|𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠) = 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 
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Although stress tests and systemic risk measure proposed by Brownlees and Engle (2011) 
have the same goal, different approaches are used in them. The conditional expectation that 
is being calculated in the stress test is typically “bottom up” measures where resilience and 
viability of the financial firm is being assessed. However, the “top-down” stress test has been 
boosted after the recent global financial crisis. This approach has the same goal while it 
focuses on macro-prudential perspective (ECB 2013). Brownlees and Engle (2011) use this 
approach for their new measure of systemic risk. In this regard, they use equity value as a 
way of measuring the value of the firm’s assets. 
 
SRISK proposed by Brownlees and Engle (2011) measures the capital shortfall of a financial 
institution if a future crisis occurs. In other words, it estimates how much capital a financial 
firm needs to raise if there is a future financial crisis. SRISK is built upon the theoretical 
analysis of Acharya et al. (2010). It is estimated using dynamic MES, firm’s equity, and its 
leverage where MES is an equity loss that investors would experience if there is a substantial 
decline in the market.  
 
Having estimated SRISK indicates that the company which needs a huge amount of capital 
is not only the weakest company, but also the biggest contributor to the financial crisis. As a 
result, the main concern is regarding those financial institutions which might fail exactly at 
the worst possible time when the rest of economy is weak. SRISK labels a financial 
institution as systematically risky, if they are highly undercapitalized when the financial 
system as a whole is in a downturn. The first reason is that when systematically important 
firms are highly levered and they are about to collapse, their equity value declines. Thereby, 
the firms are no longer able to meet their obligations. This reduction in equity value is one 
of the main indicators of systemic distress. The second reason is that financial institutions 
are not able to function properly if their outstanding liabilities are far above their equity 
values. Such financial institutions are able to raise capital or being taken over in good times. 
However, during a financial distress, undercapitalized firms cause serious damage to both 
the financial system and real economy. 
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Acharya, Engle, and Richardson (2012) argue that SRISK is a good systemic risk measure, 
due to the fact that it is able to capture reverse causality. In other words, SRISK is able to 
answer the following questions as to whether the weak firm causes the financial crisis or 
whether a financial crisis causes a firm to be weak. They believe that SRISK is able to 
measure both ways which makes it plausible to be employed. In addition, previous research 
by Billio, Getmansky, W. Lo, and Loriana Pelizzon (2010) discuss this question of causality 
by using econometrics tool for a systemic risk measure. 
 
 
5.2. Expected Shortfall (ES) 
 
In order to present dynamic MES proposed by Brownless and Engle (2011), first expected 
shortfall (ES) is briefly reviewed. ES is a useful and coherent measure of risk which is 
proposed by Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999) to address the problem raised in vale-
at-risk (VaR). It is a complement of VaR and measures the average value that the loss exceeds 
the certain level or VaR α-quantile. ES measures the firm’s stand-alone risk, and it is a loss 
that a firm will incur if an extreme event occurs. Thus, ES can be defined as follows: 
 
(2)    𝐸𝑆𝑡 = ∑ 𝐸𝑡−1
𝑁
𝑡=1 (−𝑅𝑖,𝑡│𝑅𝑚,𝑡 <  𝐶) 
 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the equity return of firm i, and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the return on the market portfolio. Said 
differently, ES is an expected loss that is expected to happen if the portfolio has a negative 
return worse than a threshold, C. ES can be decomposed into smaller components if the firm 
return 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is considered as a summation of each group’s return, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝑖 . 
 
(3)   𝐸𝑆𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖 
𝑁
𝑡=1 𝐸𝑡−1(−𝑟𝑖,𝑡│𝑅𝑚,𝑡 <  𝐶) 
 
where 𝑤𝑖 is a weight. Therefore, ES is a weighted average of the expected loss of one asset 
group given the market declines. However, as can be seen in equation 4, MES can be 
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interpreted as each firm’s contribution to systemic losses, and can be defined as an expected 
equity loss of firm i given a broad market index falls more than C. This threshold can be 2% 
or 40%. The firm’s daily equity loss if the market return drops by 2% is a short term MES 
and the firm’s daily equity loss if the market return drops by 40% is long-term MES 
(Brownless & Engle, 2011). It is important to note that Brownless and Engle (2011) propose 
a dynamic MES (equation 10) which will be discussed in section 6. 
 
(4)   𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡−1(−𝑅𝑖,𝑡│𝑅𝑚,𝑡 <  𝐶) 
 
 
5.3. Systemic risk (SRISK) 
 
In this subsection, first Acharya’s et al. (2010) economic model is discussed. The reason is 
that Acharya’s et al. (2010) economic model is the basis of dynamic MES and SRISK 
theoretical analysis. Then, SRISK developed by Brownlees and Engle (2011) is presented in 
brief.  
 
Acharya et al. (2010) propose a simple economic model showing that how a financial 
institution contributes to systemic risk. They show that financial firms are undercapitalized 
when the market itself suffers capital shortage, and this scenario causes serious damage to 
the real economy. In order to present the model, they consider a stylized two-period model. 
In the first period, a financial institution i invests in N assets with uncertain returns based on 
the capital it has been able to raise in this period. The capital can be raised through risky debt, 
initial wealth and guaranteed deposit. 
 
(5)   𝑊 + 𝑏𝐹 + 𝐺 = 𝑋1 + 𝑋2+. . . +𝑋𝑁 
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Where W is an initial wealth, G is guaranteed demand deposits, F is a long term debt raised 
for a risky investment, b is discount price of debt, and X is the investment in asset i including 
rolling debt, and it can be negative for shorts. In the second period, the net value of 
wealth, 𝑊2, depends on returns, net of debt repayment and net of bankruptcy costs. 
 
(6)   𝑊2 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖 𝑅𝑖 − 𝐹 − 𝐺 − 𝑌(∑ 𝑋𝑖 𝑅𝑖 − 𝐹 − 𝐺)
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
𝑖=1  
 
where 𝑅𝑖 is the total returns of asset i, Y is bankruptcy costs when the wealth of the firm is 
negative or zero, for instance when the equity value is negative. If W2 is negative, the firm is 
insolvent and probably cannot raise capital. In this case, if the firm liquidates all of the assets, 
bondholders are taking a loss. However, if it is positive but low, then the firm may be illiquid 
and able to raise capital. 
 
A key problem that a firm faces in the first period is to decide about the optimal leverage 
which is based on a utility function on the value of wealth in the second period. One of the 
important feature in this equation is the bankruptcy cost. If the firm chooses to raise a huge 
amount of debt and invest in risky projects, then the probability of bankruptcy is higher. 
Furthermore, volatility has an important role to play in how much leverage the financial 
institutions takes on. If the volatility of return is low, the firm takes on more leverage. The 
reason is that the risk of facing a serious problem is relatively smaller. In other words, when 
the volatility of financial market is low, there is a high tendency for financial institutions to 
take on more leverage. Today, as the volatility is slightly lower in comparison to several years 
ago, more attentions should be paid to insure that firms are not building up leverage which 
might lead to a future financial crisis. 
 
According to the assumption made by Acharya et al. (2010), when a firm is illiquid or 
bankrupt, indicating it is undercapitalized, there are not only costs to debtholders, but there 
are also external costs to real economy. In the severe case when the market as a whole is 
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undercapitalized, the negative externalities from these institutions cause adverse damage to 
both real and financial sector. Acharya et al. (2010) argue that financial institutions are more 
likely to take on more risk when the external cost to society is not internalized. As a result, 
there should be a regulation to force financial institutions to internalize such negative 
externalities.  
 
Acharya et al. (2010) also argue that during a financial distress, if a financial institution goes 
bankrupt, this bankruptcy cost cannot be absorbed by other financial firms connected to the 
bankrupted firm. Consequently, supply of credit for business activities comes to standstill if 
the financial sector is undercapitalized. The main reason is that firms are not able to raise 
capital during a financial downturn. The capital shortfall causes not only a cost to 
debtholders, but it causes also a cost to the economy in particular when the financial sector 
suffers from capital shortage. That is why measuring capital shortfall for each firm during a 
crisis is the main motivation in Brownless and Engle’s (2011) paper. 
 
If the ratio of asset to equity value that a financial institution should keep in the first period 
as capital buffer is k, then the capital buffer requirement for the firm at the end of first period 
is calculated in equation 7. 
 
(7)   k(𝑏1𝐹𝑖1 + 𝐺𝑖1 + 𝑊𝑖1) − 𝑊𝑖1 
 
According to equation 7, the firm faces capital shortfall if the calculated value in equation 7 
is positive. Therefore capital shortfall, SRISK , is calculated under an assumption that book 
value of debt is unchanged in the next six months. The prudential capital requirement, k, is 
set to be 8%. Having leverage and equity losses in the next six months, and long run marginal 
expected shortfall (LRMES), SRISK is computed as follows: 
 
(8) 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐸 ((𝑘(𝐷 + 𝐸) − 𝐸)│𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠) = 𝑘𝐷𝑖,𝑡 − (1 − 𝑘)(1 − 𝐿𝑅𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡) × 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
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Where LRMES  𝑖𝑠 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−18 × 𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡(2%)) , D is firm’s i book value of debt, E is the 
market value of equity or market capitalization of firm i and k is set to be 8%. However, V-
Lab has recently changed the estimation method of LRMES. In the new method, LRMES is 
estimated through 1-exp (log(1-C)×β), where C is 40% which is a default value for the six-
month crisis, and β is the firm's CAPM beta. It is also important to note that SRISK as a 
percentage value is defined as of equation 9. 
 
(9)   𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾%𝑖 =
𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖
∑ 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑖
 
 
SRISK has several key features.  One of the main features of SRISK is that it accounts for 
the size of financial institution. In other words, it rises as the size of the firm increases if the 
leverage keeps constant. In addition, there is a positive relationship between debt of the firm 
and systemic risk, suggesting that if the debt of the firm increases, it has a positive effect on 
systemic risk. A negative externality to the financial firm has also a positive effect on 
systemic risk. 
 
In brief, SRISK can be computed in three steps. First, MES is estimated dynamically. 
Brownlees and Engle (2011) present a simple and flexible time series approach to estimate 
MES dynamically which will be discussed in the next section. In order to estimate MES, 
time-varying volatility and correlation are modeled via GJR-GARCH and dynamic 
conditional correlation (DCC) models. Second, LRMES is estimated by extrapolation to a 
full financial crisis. LRMES is a firm equity loss if market return declines by 40% in the next 
6 months. LRMES can be estimated through simulations. Finally, the capital shortfall 
(SRISK) is calculated. 
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6. ECONOMETRIC APPROACHES FOR CALCULATING MES  
 
In order to estimate MES dynamically, Brownless and Engle (2011) use a bivariate and 
flexible time series approach to modeling time-varying volatilities, correlations and tail 
dependence. In this regard, first the equity return of a firm, Ri,t, and the market as a whole are 
modeled. As can be seen from equation 10, return on the broad market, Rm,t, is the product of 
volatility process, 𝜎𝑚,𝑡 , and an innovation factor, 𝜀𝑚,𝑡. The return of an individual firm can 
be estimated similar to the broad market index with the exception that the innovation factor 
has time varying correlation with the innovation in market return. 𝜉𝑖,𝑡 is firm specific 
innovation.  
 
(10)   𝑅𝑚,𝑡 = 𝜎𝑚,𝑡𝜀𝑚,𝑡 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜎𝑖,𝑡 (𝜌𝑖,𝑚,𝑡𝜀𝑡 + √1 − 𝜌𝑖,𝑚,𝑡
2 𝜉𝑖,𝑡) 
(𝜀𝑚,𝑡, 𝜉𝑖,𝑡) ~ 𝐹 
 
F is a non-parametric copula to estimate a tail dependence. Disturbances (𝜀𝑚,𝑡, 𝜉𝑖,𝑡) are 
serially independent with mean zero, variance one, and covariance zero. They (𝜀𝑚,𝑡, 𝜉𝑖,𝑡) are 
uncorrelated but they are not necessarily independent random variables. This is a case where 
uncorrelatedness is different from independence. The reason is that there might be a tail 
dependence between the two shocks if the market shock is a large negative number. Also, 
the disturbance distribution does not follow a specific distributional assumption and it is 
based on a flexible method for inferential statistics allowing tail dependence. This 
specification allows disturbance to have a non-linear dependence. If equation 10 is 
substituted in equation 4, a one-period-ahead expression for MES can be presented as the 
form of equation 11 which is a function of the tail dependence, asymmetric volatility and 
time-varying correlation: 
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(11)   𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡−1(−𝑅𝑖,𝑡│𝑅𝑚,𝑡 <  𝐶) = 
𝜎𝑖,𝑡𝜌𝑡𝐸𝑡−1 (𝜀𝑚,𝑡│𝜀𝑚,𝑡 <
𝐶
𝜎𝑚,𝑡⁄ ) + 𝜎𝑖,𝑡√1 − 𝜌𝑡
2 𝐸𝑡−1 (𝜉𝑖,𝑡│𝜀𝑚,𝑡 <
 𝐶 𝜎𝑚,𝑡⁄ )  
 
The first part of equation is a product of three components, namely, the volatility of the firm, 
the correlation of the firm return with the market return, and expected shortfall for the market. 
While the individual firm risk only depends on  𝜎𝑖,𝑡 , systemic risk depends on whether this 
risk occurs at the same time as the economy is weak. As a result, from the systemic point of 
view, it is the product of the volatility and the correlation. The third term in the first part of 
equation is the expected shortfall for the market, but that is actually the same for all firms. It 
changes over time but it is constant in any cross section. Therefore, correlations and 
volatilities are changing for each firm. The second part of equation shows the expected value 
of orthogonal innovation for the firm if the market innovation is in its tail. If the two 
disturbances are independent, then the whole second part of equation 11 will be zero. 
However, if there is a tail dependence, a second part of equation 11 appears. Firms are risky 
if they have high volatility and they are systematically risky if they also have high 
correlations.  
 
 
6.1. Tail dependence 
 
According to the equation 11, 𝐸𝑡−1(𝜉𝑖,𝑡│𝜀𝑚,𝑡 < 𝐾) and 𝐸𝑡−1(𝜀𝑚,𝑡│𝜀𝑚,𝑡 < 𝐾) terms need to 
be estimated through the non-parametric kernel estimation approach.  The tail dependence 
can be simply estimated by calculating how often the firm’s return is in the negative tail when 
the market return is also in the negative tail. Equation 12 can be used to estimate the tail 
expectations non-parametrically. 
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(12)   ?̂?𝑡−1(𝜉𝑖,𝑡│𝜀𝑚,𝑡 < 𝐾) =
∑ 𝜉𝑖,𝑡 𝐼 (𝜀𝑚,𝑡<𝐾)𝑡
∑ 𝐼 (𝜀𝑚,𝑡<𝐾)𝑡
 
   ?̂?𝑡−1(𝜀𝑚,𝑡│𝜀𝑚,𝑡 < 𝐾) =
∑ 𝜀𝑚,𝑡 𝐼 (𝜀𝑚,𝑡<𝐾)𝑡
∑ 𝐼 (𝜀𝑚,𝑡<𝐾)𝑡
 
 
where ?̂?𝑡−1(𝜉𝑖,𝑡│𝜀𝑚,𝑡 < 𝐾) and ?̂?𝑡−1(𝜀𝑚,𝑡│𝜀𝑚,𝑡 < 𝐾) are the average of the market and firm 
residuals when the market returns are less than a constant, K. This estimation can be smooth 
by using kernel in equation 13. 
 
(13)   ?̂?𝑡−1(𝜉𝑖,𝑡│𝜀𝑚,𝑡 < 𝐾) =
∑ 𝜉𝑖,𝑡  𝐺ℎ (𝐾−𝜀𝑚)𝑡
∑  𝐺ℎ (𝐾−𝜀𝑚)𝑡
 
?̂?𝑡−1(𝜀𝑚,𝑡│𝜀𝑚,𝑡 < 𝐾) =
∑ 𝜀𝑚,𝑡 𝐺ℎ (𝐾 − 𝜀𝑚)𝑡
∑  𝐺ℎ (𝐾 − 𝜀𝑚)𝑡
 
 
Where 𝐺ℎ(𝑡) = ∫ 𝑘(𝑢)
ℎ
−ℎ
𝑑𝑢, and 𝑘(𝑢) is a kernel function. Scaillet (2005) discusses the 
properties of such tail expectations in his paper. 
 
 
6.2. Volatility 
 
In the equation 11, the volatilities are asymmetric GARCH model. In the Brownless and 
Engle’s (2011) paper, the volatility process for estimating 𝜎𝑖,𝑡 and 𝜎𝑚,𝑡 , is modeled based 
on asymmetric GARCH proposed by Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1993). The reason 
for using an asymmetric GARCH model is that although GARCH model is able to capture 
volatility clustering, it is unable to capture the asymmetric effects in the volatility process 
and it treats the negative and positive returns alike. In this model an extra parameter is added 
which captures the leverage effects. 
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(14)   𝜎𝑚,𝑡
2 = 𝜔𝑚𝐺 + 𝛼𝑚𝐺𝑟𝑚,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛾𝑚𝐺𝑟𝑚,𝑡−1
2 𝐼𝑚,𝑡−1
− + 𝛽𝑚𝐺𝜎𝑚,𝑡−1
2  
    𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2 = 𝜔𝑖𝐺 + 𝛼𝑖𝐺𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛾𝑖𝐺𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1
2 𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1
− + 𝛽𝑖𝐺𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2  
 
where 𝐼𝑖,𝑡
− = 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 < 0 and 𝐼𝑖,𝑚
− = 𝑟𝑖,𝑚 < 0. The model is able to capture the leverage effect, 
indicating a stronger volatility tendency during the market downturn than market boom. The 
response of the volatility of return is different with negative and positive returns. The 
parameters of GJR-GARCH process can be estimated using quasi-maximum likelihood 
(QLM). 
 
 
6.3. DCC Model 
 
In order to calculate the time varying correlation in equation 11, Brownless and Engle (2011) 
use DCC model. The reason is that the assumption of the constant conditional correlation 
proposed by Bollerslev (1990) is not plausible, since the correlation among assets is changing 
over time.  That is why the DCC approach proposed by Engle (2002), and Engle and 
Sheppard (2001) is applied for estimating time-varying correction. This approach is 
computed easily in two steps. In the first step, the conditional variance is estimated using 
GARCH models. In the second step, the conditional correlation is computed based on the 
given parameters in the first step and after standardizing the residuals by their standard 
deviations. In the DCC model, the variance covariance matrix (VARCOVARt) is a positive 
definite matrix over time and the process is stationary. Brownless and Engle (2011) present 
the following framework to estimate DCC model. 
 
(15)   𝑉𝐴𝑅𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡𝐻𝑡𝐷𝑡 
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𝐷𝑡 =
[
 
 
 √𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 0
0 √𝜎𝑚𝑡
2
]
 
 
 
 
𝐻𝑡 = [
1 𝜌𝑡
𝜌𝑡 1
] 
 
where 𝐷𝑡 is a diagonal matrix with standard deviation on the diagonal, and zero off the 
diagonal, 𝐷𝑡
𝑖𝑖 = √𝜎𝑖𝑡
2  and if 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐷𝑡
𝑖𝑗 = 0 . Time-varying standard deviations are 
estimated using GARCH models. Furthermore, 𝐻𝑡 is a conditional correlation matrix which 
contains correlations between the firm and the market. 
 
The DCC framework does not model the dynamic correlation matrix directly. Instead, a 
pseudo-correlation matrix, 𝑄𝑡, is introduced in order to capture the dynamics in the 
correlation. Therefore, a positive definite matrix,𝑄𝑡, is used to estimate the dynamic 
conditional correlation matrix, 𝐻𝑡. Furthermore, in order to have a positive definite 
matrix, 𝑄𝑡 , same restrictions as the GARCH model are imposed on 𝑄𝑡, such as 𝛼 > 0, 𝛽 >
0, 𝑎 + 𝛽 < 1. 
 
(16)   𝐻𝑡 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔 (𝑄𝑡)
−1/2 𝑄𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔 (𝑄𝑡)
−1/2     
 
where diag( 𝑄𝑡) has the same elements of the 𝑄𝑡 matrix on its diagonal and zero off its 
diagonal, indicating that diag(𝑄𝑡)𝑖𝑗 = (𝑄𝑡)𝑖𝑗 1𝑖=𝑗. 𝑄𝑡 is the dynamic correlation structure 
which is defined as of the following form:  
 
(17)   𝑄𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)?̅? + 𝛼𝜀𝑡−1𝜀𝑡−1
′ + 𝛽𝑄𝑡−1 
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In equation 17, ?̅? is the unconditional covariance with an average of standardized residuals, 
and 𝜀𝑡−1 has the rescaled standardized residuals.  ?̅? also indicates the Bollerslev's Constant 
Conditional Correlation (CCC) Estimator (Bollerslev 1990) which can be calculated as ?̅? =
1
𝑇
∑ 𝜀𝑡𝜀𝑡
′𝑇
𝑡=1 . The equation 17 is similar to GARCH process after “variance targeting” of Engle 
and Mezrich (1995) is adopted. If variance targeting is not applied, the DCC model 
estimation would be more complicated. Variance targeting reduces the parameter estimations 
to two, otherwise 2 + 𝑛
𝑛+1
2
 parameters are needed to be estimated. This volatility targeting 
helps DCC model to be more parsimonious.  
 
The DCC model is able to capture stylized facts about correlation, namely correlation 
clustering and mean reversion. Therefore, if the correlation at time t-1 is high, there is a high 
tendency that the correlation at time t is also high. Also, a shock at time t-1 influences the 
correlation in the next period. In addition, if α+β <1, the correlation is jumping around the 
mean, ?̅? , which is unconditional correlation. The DCC model is mean reverting to 
unconditional correlation, and the correlation temporarily deviates by going above or below 
the average. The parameters α and β describe how long the deviation lasts. It is important to 
note that the estimation of parameters in DCC model can be done by using QLM.  
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7. BANK LIQUIDITY CREATION MEASURE 
 
In order to construct the liquidity creation measure, Berger and Bouwman’s (2009) approach 
is followed in this study. This measure is a comprehensive measure of bank output, since it 
measures all bank’s on and off balance sheet activities. This approach is easily calculated in 
three steps. According to Berger and Bouwman (2009), first bank’s on and off balance sheet 
activities are categorized according to information on either maturity or product category 
except for the loans which are classified based only on category or only on maturity. They 
argue that the ability of loan sale or securitization is more important than the maturity of 
loans, indicating the importance of off balance sheet liquidity creation. Thus, Berger and 
Bouwman develop four different liquidity creation measures which alternatively classify 
loans based on maturity or category as well as excluding or including off balance sheet items 
for bank activities. 
 
This study uses Berger and Bouwman’s (2009) preferred liquidity creation measure which 
accounts for both on and off balance sheet liquidity creation. The reason for choosing this 
measure is that off balance sheet liquidity creation constructs more than half of the liquidity 
created by the US banks, suggesting the importance of off balance sheet liquidity creation 
(Berger and Bouwman 2009). Their favorable measure categorizes loans entirely by product 
category and includes off balance sheet activities as well. Moreover, this study also 
decomposes their preferred measure, catfat, into its two components, namely, on and off 
balance sheet liquidity creation for the further investigation.  
 
Bereger and Bouwman’s (2009) liquidity creation measure is calculated in three steps. In the 
first step, they classify all bank’s on and off balance sheet activities (e.g. assets, liabilities, 
equity, derivatives and guarantees) as illiquid, semi-liquid and liquid. The classification of 
assets and liabilities is based on ease, cost and the time for the bank to provide liquidity for 
customers when requested. They also use the same approach for classifying bank’s off 
balance sheet activities. Table 1 represents the classification of assets, liabilities and equity 
as well as derivatives and guarantees. The information on Call Reports is used for this 
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classification. All on and off balance sheet items presented in the table are analogous to the 
Berger and Bouwman (2009) paper. 
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Table 1. Construction of liquidity creation measure. 
Category measure 
Assets 
Illiquid assets (+1/2) Semiliquid assets (0) Liquid assets (-1/2) 
Commercial real estate loans Residential real estate loans 
Cash and due from other 
institutions 
Loans to finance agricultural 
production Consumer loans 
All securities (regardless of 
maturity) 
Commercial and industrial loans Loans to depository institutions Trading assets 
Other loans and lease financing 
receivables 
Loans to state and local 
governments Federal fund sold 
Other real estate owned Loans to foreign governments  
Customers' liability on bankers’ 
acceptances   
Investment in unconsolidated 
subsidiaries   
Intangible assets   
Premises   
Other assets   
Liabilities and equity 
Liquid liabilities (+1/2) Semiliquid liabilities (0) 
Illiquid liabilities and equity 
(-1/2) 
Transaction deposits Time deposits 
Bank's liabilities on 
banker’s acceptances 
Saving deposits Other borrowed money Subordinated debt 
Overnight federal funds purchased  Other liabilities 
Trading liabilities  Equity 
Off-balance sheet guarantees 
Illiquid guarantees (+1/2) Semiliquid guarantees (0) Liquid guarantees (-1/2) 
Unused commitments Net credit derivatives Net participations acquired 
Net standby letters of credit Net securities lent  
Commercial and similar letters of 
credit   
All other off-balance sheet 
liabilities   
Off-balance sheet derivatives 
 Liquid derivatives (-1/2) 
 
Interest rate derivatives 
Foreign exchange 
derivatives 
Equity and commodity 
derivatives 
Note: Source: Bank Liquidity Creation. Berger and Bouwman (2009:3791–3792) 
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Call Reports divide the bank loan portfolio into different categories. It distinguishes between 
residential and customer loans, or industrial and business loans. For example, Berger and 
Bouwman (2009) classify commercial loans as illiquid assets, while residential loans are 
classified as semi-liquid assets. The reason for this classification is that residential loans can 
be easily securitized with low costs, and they can be easily traded in the market. However, 
commercial loans are harder to be securitized. 
 
On the liability side of the balance sheet, saving deposits, Fed funds purchased and 
transaction deposits are considered as liquid. The reason is that customers can easily 
withdraw funds on demand without any cost. Time deposits are categorized as semi-liquid, 
since customers withdraw funds with difficulties relative to saving and transaction deposits. 
Also, equity capital is considered as illiquid liabilities, since investors can obtain funds by 
trading the equity of banks in the market. As a result, it is the market which can create the 
liquidity for the investors and not the banks. 
 
Off balance sheet items are classified similar to on balance sheet activities. For example, loan 
commitments are classified as illiquid because they are similar to illiquid loans and from the 
bank’s point of view they are illiquid. Also, the bank cannot trade them easily. Furthermore, 
interest rate derivatives, foreign exchange derivatives and equity and commodity derivatives 
are all categorized as liquid, because they can be easily traded in the market. It is important 
to note that the gross value of all the aforementioned derivatives are employed in order to 
calculate off-balance sheet liquidity creation, because the gross values consist of positive and 
negative values which show the amount of liquidity the bank is creating or absorbing. 
 
In the second step, positive (+1/2), negative (-1/2) and neutral (0) weights are assigned to 
each on and off balance sheet item classified in the first step. The assigned weights are in 
parallel with financial intermediation theory arguing that liquidity is created on the balance 
sheet when illiquid assets are transformed to liquid liabilities. In other words, banks create 
liquidity by removing illiquid item (e.g. long term illiquid assets) from the public and in 
return provide liquid items for the public (e.g. short-term deposits). A positive (+1/2) weight 
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is given to liquid liabilities and illiquid assets, and a negative (-1/2) weight is given to illiquid 
liabilities and equity capital and liquid assets. A neutral (0) weight is assigned to semi-liquid 
items. In this regard, banks can create maximum liquidity if illiquid assets are financed by 
liquid liabilities. In addition, banks can destroy liquidity if liquid assets are financed by 
illiquid liabilities. Table 1 also presents the positive, zero and negative weights assigned to 
each items. In the third step, all bank activities classified in the first step and all weights 
assigned in the second step are combined and Berger and Bouwman’s (2009) favorable 
liquidity creation measure is constructed: 
 
(18) 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = [[(1 2⁄ × 𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 ) + (0 ×  𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑖 −
𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 ) + (−1 2⁄  ×  𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)] + [(
1
2⁄ × 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠) +
(0 × 𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑖 − 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠) + (−1 2⁄  𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠)] +
(1 2⁄ 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙) + [(
1
2⁄ × 𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑠) + (0 × 𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑖 −
𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑠) + (−1 2⁄ × 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑠 ) + (−
1
2⁄ × 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠]] 
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8. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
 
This study analyzes a sample of 26 large US commercial and depository banks with the 
period spanning 2001–2014. Although the dataset used in this study seems small, it covers 
on average almost 42% of all commercial banks regarding bank’s total assets value over the 
sample period. Also, the dataset employed in this study composes of either SIFIs or non- 
SIFIs.  
 
In order to collect the data, first all the US commercial banks are identified for which the 
systemic risk measure, SRISK, is available on the NYU Stern’s V-Lab website. Then, from 
the preliminary sample, the commercial banks are eliminated for which the Call Reports are 
not available on the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) website. 
Thus, the dataset used in this study is an intersection of available data from Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) website and V-Lab website. This criterion leaves 
26 US banks with an unbalanced panel of 360 firm-year observations. The dataset consists 
of 8 SIFIs, and 18 non-SIFIs. Table 2 reports the US commercial banks which are considered 
as systematically important banks, according to the Financial Stability Board, as of 
November 2015. Moreover, Table 3 represents other banks used in this study which are 
considered as non-SIFIs. It is important to note that the data on Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley are collected from 2008 onwards when they changed their business strategy towards 
commercial banks. 
 
 
Table 2. Systematically important financial institutions. 
Name Ticker 
Bank of America BAC 
Bank of New York Mellon BK 
Citibank C 
Goldman Sachs GS 
JP Morgan Chase JPM 
Morgan Stanley MS 
State Street STT 
Wells Fargo WFC 
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Table 3. Non-systematically important financial institutions. 
 
Name Ticker 
Branch Banking & Trust BBT 
Capital One COF 
Comerica Bank CMA 
Compass Bank CBSS 
Commerce Bank CBSH 
Fifth Third Bank FITB 
Huntington National Bank HBAN 
Keybank KEY 
Manufacturers and Traders 
Bank 
MTB 
M&I Marshel and Ilsley 
Bank 
MI 
National City Bank NCC 
Northern Trust NTRS 
PNC Bank PNC 
Regions Bank RF 
Sovereign Bank  SOV 
Suntrust Bank STI 
Synovus Bank SNV 
Zions ZION 
 
 
In order to calculate the liquidity creation measure, first Call Reports which contain detailed 
financial information are collected from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council (FFIEC) website. The bank liquidity creation for each bank in dollar value -not the 
aggregate- is calculated for all 360 panel observations consistent with Berger and Bouwman 
(2009) liquidity creation measure which was discussed before. The data on liquidity creation 
for virtually all banks in the US is also publically available at Bouwman website. After 
calculating the liquidity creation measure, all figures were compared with the available data 
to ensure the validity of the data.  
 
After calculating the liquidity creation measure, this measure is also broken down into its 
two main components, namely, on balance sheet liquidity creation (LC.onBS) and off balance 
sheet liquidity creation (LC.offBS) for the further investigation. The reason for the liquidity 
creation breakout is to investigate which component is the main variable for explaining the 
cross-sectional variation in the level of systemic risk.  
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In this study, several variables are included in the regression as control variables which are 
assumed to have an effect on the level of systemic risk. According to previous studies 
discussed before, there are various determinants of bank’s contribution to systemic risk. 
Different bank specific characteristics such as size, profitability, and loan growth are 
controlled for. Non-performing loans as a balance sheet quality factor are also used as a 
control variable. The data on control variables are collected from Bureau van Dijk 
Bankscope.   
 
Size is one of the factors influencing systemic risk as documented by Pais and Stork (2011). 
However, unlike other studies which use logarithm of total assets (logTA) as a proxy for size, 
this study controls for size by including dummy variables for bank average total assets. In 
order to account for bank size, banks are grouped into three size classes (small, medium and 
large) according to their average total assets over the sample period, then dummy variables 
are assigned to each bank based on this size criterion. The reason for including dummy 
variables instead of logTA is that logTA is strongly positively correlated with liquidity 
creation measure causing potential multicollinearity. Another reason for employing this 
modified firm-specific effects is that while commercial banks considerably differ in total 
assets in each cross section, the total assets appear to display only little variation over time 
implying that banks being in the upper tercile at time t are likely to be in the same tercile at 
time t+1 and so on.  
 
In addition to bank size, return on asset (ROA) is a proxy for bank profitability, and it is 
computed as net income to total assets. Also, in this analysis, the percentage change in 
outstanding loans is a proxy for bank’s growth. Non-interest income is another factor 
influencing systemic risk as documented by Brunnermeier et al. (2012). Thus, the ratio of 
non-interest income to total income (NON-INTI) which is a proxy for non-traditional 
banking activities is also included in the regression as a control variable. In addition, 
consistent with the recent study by Mayordomo et al. (2014), deposits to assets (DtA) is 
included in the regression as a proxy for traditional banking activities. In this regard, 
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Mayordomo et al. (2014) discuss that since deposit taking is a traditional banking activity, 
DtA ratio can negatively contribute to systemic risk, because it provides a cushion to absorb 
losses. The ratio of non-performing loans to total assets (NON-PRFML) is also controlled 
for in the panel regression, because the recent study by Mayordomo et al. (2014) documents 
that non-performing loans to total loans has a significant positive effect on systemic risk.  
 
It is important to note that similar to studies by Iqbal et al. (2015), Brunnermeier et al. (2012) 
and Mayordomo et al. (2014), this study controlled for capital ratio (leverage ratio) in the 
panel regression at the beginning of the study, however, later this variable was excluded from 
the regression due to two reasons. First, this variable did not have any significant effect as 
the coefficient on this variable was insignificant in all model specifications. Second, 
including capital ratio not only had any significant effect, but including this variable reduced 
the explanatory power of the model by reducing the adjusted R2. 
 
The detailed accounting information, definitions, sources and calculations of each variable 
used in this study are listed in table 4. As shown in table 4, all the financial statements and 
balance sheet variables are extracted from Bureau van Dijk Bankscope. Also, Call Reports 
are extracted in order to calculate the liquidity creation measure.  
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Table 4. Variable Definitions.  
The table reports the definitions of variables employed in this study as well as sources of the 
accounting ratios, systemic risk and the liquidity creation measure. The table also reports calculation 
methods used in this study 
 
Variable Name Calculation Source 
SRISK Systemic risk measure (in $ billion)       - 
 NYU Stern’s 
V-Lab 
   
LC.catfat Total liquidity creation (in $ billion) Calculated from equation 18 
Call Reports 
from FFIEC 
website 
LC.onBS 
On balance sheet liquidity creation (in $ 
billion) Decomposition of LC.catfat  - 
LC.offBS 
Off balance sheet liquidity creation (in $ 
billion) Decomposition of LC.catfat  - 
DtA Deposits to total assets 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
  Bankscope 
ROA Return on asset 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
  Bankscope 
LG Loan growth %change in loans  Bankscope 
NON-INTI Non-interest income 
𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
  Bankscope 
NON-
PRFML Non-performing loan 
𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠
  Bankscope 
 
 
In order to empirically investigate the relationship between liquidity creation and systemic 
risk, this study applies several alternative panel regressions with fixed-effects as presented 
below: 
 
(19) SRISK𝒊𝒕 = α + β1𝐿𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + β2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + β3 𝐿𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1 + β4𝐷𝑡𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + β5𝑁𝑂𝑁 −
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + β6𝑁𝑂𝑁 − 𝑃𝑅𝐹𝑀𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖
𝑛−1
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑡𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡
2014
𝑡=2001 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
(20) SRISK𝒊𝒕 = α + β1𝐿𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + β2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + β3 𝐿𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1 + β4𝐷𝑡𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + β5𝑁𝑂𝑁 −
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + β6𝑁𝑂𝑁 − 𝑃𝑅𝐹𝑀𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖
𝑛−1
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑡𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡
2014
𝑡=2001 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
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where SRISK𝒊𝒕 is the systemic risk measure for firm i at time t. LC is alternatively defined as 
total liquidity creation, LC.catfat, which measures on and off balance sheet liquidity creation 
for each bank in dollar amount or one of its components, namely, on balance sheet liquidity 
creation (LC.onBS) or off balance sheet liquidity creation (LC.offBS), for each bank in dollar 
value. The definitions on control variables can be found in table 4. One lagged period is used 
for all explanatory variables to reduce the endogeneity problem.  
 
It is important to note that in the first panel specification (equation 19), state fixed-
effects, ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖
𝑛−1
𝑖=1  are included in the regression by adding state dummy variables which 
control for both observable and unobservable time-invariant variables across states and they 
deal with potential omitted variable bias. Furthermore, in the second panel regression 
modification (equation 20), bank size fixed-effects are included in the regression by adding 
three binary variables where the first dummy indicates the 33% of the banks that exhibit the 
highest average in total assets over the sample period, and the third dummy indicates the 
banks exhibiting the lowest 33% of average total assets over the sample period. In addition 
to state and bank fixed-effects, time fixed effects ∑ 𝛾𝑡𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡
2014
𝑡=2001  , are also included in the 
regression by adding fiscal dummy variables.  
 
In order to examine the effect of liquidity creation on systemic risk during the 2008 financial 
crisis, equation 19 and 20 are modified in such a way that an interaction term, 𝐿𝐶 ×
𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦, is included in the regression. The CrisisDummy is a dummy variable which 
takes the value 1 if the year is 2008, and zero otherwise. In this analysis, 2008 is considered 
to be an exogenous shock as Lehman Brothers collapsed in September 2008. 
 
One can argue that why firm fixed-effect is not used in this study. There are several reasons 
why this study uses state and bank size fixed-effects instead of firm fixed-effects. First, as 
discussed before, due to potential multicollinearity problem this analysis uses a modified firm 
fixed-effects by sorting all banks with respect to the average total assets over the sample 
period into three deciles in order to account for bank size. Therefore, bank size fixed-effects 
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and firm fixed-effects cannot be applied at the same time in the regression model. Second, 
including firm fixed-effects in the panel regressions makes the coefficient on the liquidity 
creation measure insignificant. The reason might be due to the fact that a large fraction of 
SRISK is explained by firm fixed-effects, and that is why the coefficient on the liquidity 
creation measure appears to be no longer significant. The recent study by Iqbal et al. (2015) 
also excludes firm fixed-effects from their panel regression specifications due to the same 
problem. Third, relatively small sample size would affect degree of freedom, and including 
dummy variables for each firm leads to estimation of more parameters in the panel resulting 
in a lack of power in t statistics. Said differently, since the sample is relatively small, using 
the modified firm-specific effects may also increase the power of the test statistics because it 
ensures more degrees of freedom for estimating the point estimators in the panel than simple 
firm-specific effects. 
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9. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
In this section, first descriptive statistics for each variable employed in this study is reported. 
Next, pairwise correlations for the variables used in this analysis is presented. Then, the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) test is conducted to ensure the explanatory variables do not 
suffer from multicollinearity problem. Finally, regression results for different model 
specifications are discussed.  
 
 
9.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables employed in the empirical analysis. 
It can be clearly seen from the table that the sample of commercial banks used in this study 
is heterogeneous with regard to the liquidity creation variable, as the value of LC.catfat 
measure lies between -50.26 and 808.68. The positive and negative values of liquidity 
creation indicate that large banks not only create liquidity for the public, but they also destroy 
it in some cases. In addition, the sample of large US commercial banks is heterogamous 
regarding SRISK, as it varies from -53 to a maximum of 142.97. The heterogeneity can also 
be seen with regard to control variables, reflecting the fact that the dataset used in this study 
is diverse and it is an appropriate sample of the entire population. 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics.  
The table represents the descriptive statistics (mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, 
maximum, first and third quartile, and the number of observations) for the sample. The descriptive 
statistics obtained using information of the 26 large US banks reported in tables 2 and 3 from 2000 
to 2014.  
 
Variable Mean Median St.dev Min Max P25 P75 
No.of 
obs 
SRISK($ billions) 6.795 -0.125 27.68 -53.01 142.97 -2.429 3.797 346 
LC.catfat($ billions) 90.326 35.191 145.89 -50.26 808.68 11.521 79.631 360 
CR 10.34 9.54 3.547 5.543 31.795 8.086 11.716 359 
ROA 0.001 0.011 0.01 -0.061 0.045 0.007 0.013 359 
LG 14.825 6.49 40.036 -42.22 382.27 0.77 14.35 357 
DtA 0.803 0.807 0.06 0.411 0.917 0.775 0.84 358 
NON-INTI 43.78 39.69 20.375 -18.56 175.04 30.44 50.84 358 
NON-PRFML 1.713 0.9 2.624 0 36.57 0.45 2.32 355 
 
 
Figure 4 shows how the dollar amount of total liquidity created by the large US banks and 
its on and off balance sheet components changes over the sample period from 2000 to 2014. 
As can be seen from the figure, there are two downward slops over the sample period 
representing the recent financial crisis and dot.com bubble crisis. Before the recent global 
financial meltdown, total and off balance sheet liquidity creation increased significantly, 
while on balance sheet liquidity creation almost remained unchanged. However, after the 
recent financial crisis, on balance sheet liquidity created by large banks has started to 
increase. The figure also indicates that most of liquidity created by the large banks are coming 
from their off balance sheet activities.  
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Figure 4. Liquidity creation (in $ billion) by large US banks over the sample period. 
 
 
 
9.2. Correlation matrix  
 
Table 6 reports the correlations among variables. The correlation matrix shows that LC.catfat 
is strongly positively correlated with SRISK (48%), suggesting that high liquidity creation is 
associated positively with systemic risk. Furthermore, the correlation matrix indicates that 
NON-PRFML is strongly positively correlated with systemic risk, while DtA has a negative 
association with systemic risk which are consistent with a recent study by Mayordomo et al. 
(2014). In parallel with the study by Brunnermeier et al. (2012) who document that banks 
which are more involved in non-interest income activities positively contributes to systemic 
risk, the ratio of non-interest income to total assets is also positively associated with systemic 
risk. 
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Table 6. Correlation matrix. 
The table reports pairwise correlations for the variables used in this study, namely, systemic risk 
(SRISK), total liquidity creation measure (LC.catfat), return on assets (ROA), non-performing loans 
(NON-PRFML), non-interest income (NON-INTI), deposit to total assets (DtA), and loan growth 
(LG). The correlation matrix obtained using information of the 26 large US banks reported in tables 
2 and 3 from 2000 to 2014.  
 
         LC.catfat            ROA 
      NON-
INTI   NON-PRFML         LG         DtA 
SRISK 0.482 -0.207 0.040 0.442 -0.065 -0.094 
LC.catfat 1.000 -0.030 -0.074 0.262 -0.032 -0.148 
ROA  1.000 0.243 -0.379 -0.127 -0.199 
NON-INTI   1.000 -0.084 -0.108 -0.205 
NON-PRFML    1.000 -0.045 -0.076 
LG     1.000 0.010 
DtA      1.000 
 
 
9.3. Variance inflation factor test 
 
It is important to note that variance inflation factor (VIF) test is performed to ensure that the 
results are not influenced by multicollinearity problem between explanatory variables. Table 
7 reports the VIF test for all explanatory variables. As can be seen, the VIF test suggests that 
the regression models do not suffer from multicollinearity as almost all VIF values are around 
1. 
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Table 7. Variance inflation factor (VIF) test. 
The table reports the VIF test for the explanatory variables used in the empirical analysis: total 
liquidity creation measure (LC.catfat), return on assets (ROA), non-performing loans (NON-
PRFML), non-interest income (NON-INTI), deposit to total assets (DtA), and loan growth (LG). 
 
          Variable                       Centered VIF 
           LC.catfat 1.183 
           DtA 2.352 
           ROA 1.626 
           LG 1.398 
           NON-INTI 1.73 
           NON-PRFML 1.106 
 
 
 
9.4. Regression results 
 
As discussed before, several alternative panel regressions are performed for examining the 
linkage between liquidity creation and systemic risk. Table 8 shows the estimates of 6 
alternatives for the main regressions (equation 19 and 20).  Models 1–3 account for state 
fixed-effects, while models 4–6 include bank size fixed-effects. Furthermore, year fixed-
effects are excluded from the regression when DummyCrisis is included in the regression. 
The table also reports that the explanatory power of the models, adjusted R2, varies from 34% 
to 44%, suggesting that independent variables are able to explain a substantial amount of 
variation in SRISK. In is also important to note that the liquidity creation measure can solely 
explain almost 35% of the variation in systemic risk measure. Not surprisingly, the F statistics 
are statically significant at 1% level for all the models, indicating a joint significance of 
explanatory variables.  
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Table 8. Regression results of 6 model specifications. 
The table reports the results of the panel regression model which is applied to a sample of 26 large 
US banks that spans from 2000 to 2014 for six panel specifications. Columns 1–6 report the results 
based on state fixed-effects and bank size fixed-effects. Columns 1 and 4 contain the results of solely 
including liquidity creation measure. Columns 2 and 5 contain the results of the main panel regression 
models. Columns 3 and 6 consider the effect of liquidity creation on systemic risk by including an 
interaction term. The results correspond to the estimated coefficient and the t-statistics (in 
parentheses) that are based on robust standard errors, which are adjusted for heteroscedasticity. ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Variable   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3   Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Liquidity creation variable:       
LC.catfat 0.116*** 0.109*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.086*** 0.071*** 
 (5.80) (5.21) (4.86) (3.70) (3.33) (3.03) 
LC.catfat × DummyCrisis2008   0.161***   0.165*** 
   (7.45)   (7.20) 
DummyCrisis   2.373   3.030 
   (1.23)   (1.50) 
Control variables:       
DtA  -82.19** -72.51**  -49.418* -31.418 
  (2.46) (-2.02)  (-1.70) (-1.27) 
ROA  -108.818 -219.935  -308.578 -369.96* 
  (-0.54) (-1.13)  (-1.25) (-1.66) 
LG  -0.016 -0.013  -0.035 -0.028 
  (-0.67) (-0.49)  (-1.19) (-0.94) 
NON-INTI  0.099* 0.107*  0.180*** 0.195*** 
  (1.86) (1.89)  (3.53) (3.51) 
NON-PRFML  2.843*** 4.663***  2.539** 4.324*** 
  (2.66) (5.42)  (2.15) (4.81) 
Constant -8.031** 50.523* 41.468  29.343 11.979 
 (-2.28) (1.82) (1.39)  (1.19) (0.57) 
       
State fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes    
Year fixed-effect Yes Yes No    
    Yes Yes Yes 
Bank size fixed-effect    Yes Yes No 
Year Fixed-effect       
       
No. of obs 320 313 313 320 313 313 
Adjusted R-square 0.354 0.400 0.442 0.338 0.381 0.424 
F-stats 7.47*** 7.45*** 12.78*** 11.17*** 10.16*** 24.00*** 
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As shown in columns 1–6 of table 8, there is a significant positive relationship between 
liquidity creation of an individual bank at time t-1 and its contribution to systemic risk at 
time t, since all the coefficients on LC.catfat in different model specifications are positive 
and statistically highly significant. This finding supports the hypothesis postulating that high 
liquidity creation positively contributes to systemic risk. 
  
To ensure that the empirical results are not driven by spurious correlation between 
independent variables, first only the main variable of analysis, namely, LC.catfat, is included 
in models 1 and 4. Second, models 2 and 5 include other control variables to further ensure 
that the results would hold in the presence of other potential control variables. After including 
other control variables, the coefficient estimates on LC.catfat in models 2 and 5 are still 
positive and highly statistically significant. The results are the same when either state fixed-
effects or bank size fixed-effects are included in the regression, indicating that after including 
bank size fixed-effects or removing potential omitted variable biased, LC can still explain 
the cross sectional variation in the level of systemic risk. For example, the coefficient on 
LC.catfat in model 2 implies that $1 increase in liquidity creation increases SRISK on 
average by $0.11. This finding suggests that if liquidity created by a commercial bank 
increases by $100, the bank would need to raise $11 capital in a future crisis. Given that the 
average total liquidity creation for the sample used in this study is almost $90 billion; $1 
billion increase in liquidity creation would increase SRISK by $110 million which can be 
considered as economically significant.  
 
It is also important to note that columns 3 and 6 of table 8 include the interaction 
term, 𝐿𝐶. 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑡 × 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦, to examine the effect of liquidity creation in the 2008 
financial crisis. As shown, the coefficients on the interaction terms are positive and highly 
statistically significant in both models, indicating that liquidity creation has a stronger 
positive effect on the level of systemic risk during the financial crisis. For example, the 
coefficient in model 3 implies that $1 increase in liquidity creation would be associated with 
$0.25 increase in SRISK in 2008 which suggests that a bank would need to raise more capital 
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during the financial crisis. The crisis effect can be found by adding the coefficients on the 
interaction term and the coefficient on LC.catfat.  
 
The significant effects of each explanatory variable can be explained in agreement with 
previous studies. First, the positive and significant effect of liquidity creation on systemic 
risk is consistent with the recent study by Berger and Bouwman (2010) documenting that 
high total liquidity creation is an indicator of a future financial crisis. Second, the positive 
and significant effect of NON-PRFML is consistent with the previous study by Mayordomo 
et al. (2014) who find that non-performing loans have a strong positive impact on systemic 
risk. Third, in regard to the negative and significant effect of DtA which is a proxy for 
traditional banking activities; previous studies by Brunnermeier et al. (2012) and Mayordomo 
et al. (2014) also find similar results, suggesting a negative relationship between traditional 
banking activities and systemic risk. Finally, the positive and significant effect of NON-INTI 
is in parallel with the study by Brunnermeier et al. (2012) documenting that banks with higher 
non-interest income positively contributes to systemic risk. 
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10. DECOMPOSING TOTAL LIQUIDITY CREATION 
 
The dollar amount of liquidity creation calculated using Berger and Bouwman’s (2009) 
preferred measure is decomposed into its two components in order to investigate whether the 
main finding is driven by on balance sheet liquidity creation, off balance sheet liquidity 
creation, or both. Table 9 shows 8 different models which alternatively account for on 
balance sheet liquidity creation (LC.onBS) or off balance sheet liquidity creation (LC.offBS). 
While models 1–4 include state fixed-effects, models 5–8 account for bank size fixed-effects. 
The results for either state fixed-effects or bank size fixed-effects reported in table 9 are 
roughly similar. Furthermore, models 3–4 and models 7–8 add an interaction term to the 
regression to examine the effect of these two components on systemic risk during the 
financial crisis. 
 
 It is important to note that the coefficients on LC.onBS in models 1 and 5 are not 
significantly different from zero at any significance level, indicating that an increase in on 
balance sheet liquidity creation of an individual commercial bank at time t-1 does not impose 
any significant effect on its contribution to the level of systemic risk. However, there is a 
significant relationship between off balance sheet liquidity creation of an individual bank at 
time t-1 and its contribution to systemic risk at time t, since the coefficients on LC.offBS in 
models 2 and 6 are positive and statistically highly significant.  
 
It is important to note that the coefficient in model 2, for example, implies that $1 increase 
in off balance sheet liquidity creation is positively associated with roughly $0.20 increase in 
systemic risk, indicating a greater effect of off balance sheet liquidity on systemic risk 
compared to the coefficient on LC.catfat in table 8. Given that the average off balance sheet 
liquidity creation for the sample used in this study is almost $56 billion; $1 billion increase 
in off liquidity creation would increase SRISK by roughly $200 million which can be 
considered as economically significant. This result is consistent with the previous literature 
by Berger and Bouwman (2010) finding that high off balance sheet liquidity creation is the 
main driver of their analysis on the prediction of an impending financial crisis. 
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Models 3–4 and 7–8 include an interaction term, 𝐿𝐶 × 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦, which is the product 
between one of the decomposed liquidity creation measures and crisisDummy. CrisisDummy 
takes a value 1 if the year is 2008 and zero otherwise. The positive and significant effects of 
the interaction terms in models 3–4 and 7–8 suggest that both on and off balance sheet 
liquidity creation have a stronger and positive effect on the level of systemic risk during the 
financial crisis. However, the effect of on balance sheet liquidity creation is weaker than the 
effect of off balance sheet liquidity creation during the crisis. For example, the coefficients 
in models 3 and 4 imply that $1 increase in on or off balance sheet liquidity creation would 
be associated with approximately $0.12 and $0.32 increase in SRISK in 2008 respectively. 
Not surprisingly, CrisisDummy in models 3–4 and 7–8 is highly statistically significant, 
indicating that banks were systematically risky during the 2008 financial crisis. Furthermore, 
the positive significant effects of NON-PRFML and NON-INTI on systemic risk are in 
parallel with previous literature as discussed before. 
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Table 9. Regression results of liquidity creation decomposition. 
The table reports the results based on two components of liquidity creation after decomposition. The panel regression model is applied to a 
sample of 26 large US banks that spans from 2000 to 2014 for eight panel specifications. Columns 1–8 report the results based on state fixed-
effects and bank size fixed-effects. Columns 1 and 5 contain the results of the main panel regressions for on-balance sheet liquidity creation. 
Columns 2 and 6 contain the results of the main panel regression models for off-balance sheet liquidity creation. Columns 3 and 7 consider 
the effect of on-balance sheet liquidity creation on systemic risk by including an interaction term. Columns 4 and 8 consider the effect of off-
balance sheet liquidity creation on systemic risk by including an interaction term The results correspond to the estimated coefficient and the t-
statistics (in parentheses) that are based on robust standard errors, which are adjusted for heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Variable    Model 1  Model 2     Model 3  Model 4    Model 5   Model 6      Model 7   Model 8 
Liquidity creation variable:         
LC.catnonfat -0.18  -0.016  0.006  0.002  
  (-1.13)  (1.03)  (0.31)  (0.13)  
LC.catnonfat × DummyCrisis2008   0.134***    0.142***  
    (4.44)    (6.39)  
Dummy2008   17.517***    17.257***  
    (6.88)    (7.09)  
LC.OffBS  0.196***  0.169***  0.165***  0.141*** 
   (6.34)  (5.18)  (4.15)  (3.63) 
LC.OffBS × DummyCrisis2008    0.147***    0.162*** 
     (4.62)    (4.67) 
Dummy2008    7.599***    7.182*** 
     (4.36)    (4.18) 
Control variables:         
DtA -50.898 -26.838 -53.607 -20.296 -48.996 -22.674 -43.570 -3.052 
  (-1.15) (-1.12) (-1.11) (-0.65) (-1.45) (-0.98) (-1.43) (-0.14) 
ROA -147.528 -2.006 -271.112 -142.796 -130.446 -173.538 -260.584 -259.525 
  (-0.52) (-0.01) (-1.02) (-0.82) (-0.51) (-0.90) (-1.01) (-1.33) 
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LG -0.018 -0.007 -0.020 -0.009 -0.035 -0.022 -0.036 -0.021 
  (-0.58) (-0.45) (-0.64) (-0.48) (-1.24) (-0.99) (-1.22) (-0.90) 
NON-INTI 0.192** 0.131** 0.192** 0.145** 0.075 0.172*** 0.099* 0.186*** 
  (2.42) (2.27) (2.47) (2.41) (1.49) (3.37) (1.83) (3.23) 
NON-PRFML 4.709*** 2.238** 5.798*** 4.310*** 4.568*** 2.062* 5.592*** 4.110*** 
  (5.70) (1.96) (7.65) (6.61) (5.28) (1.89) (8.95) (4.42) 
Constant 50.029 12.605 48.934 3.379 44.341 3.348 36.749 -15.116 
  (1.40) (0.53) (1.23) (0.13) (1.54) (0.16) (1.37) (-0.81) 
          
State fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes     
Year fixed-effect Yes Yes No No     
          
Bank size fixed-effect     Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-effect     Yes Yes No No 
          
No. of obs 313 313 313 313 313 313 313 313 
Ajusted R-square 0.252 0.531 0.248 0.541 0.255 0.486 0.349 0.514 
F-stats 4.29*** 12.05*** 5.89*** 18.53*** 6.07*** 15.07*** 11.36*** 32.72*** 
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11. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 
In this section, alternative model specifications, and other additional robustness checks are 
performed to ensure the robustness of the main empirical finding. It is important to note that 
table 10 only reports bank size fixed-effects for the robustness check in order to account for 
bank size in the panel regressions, however the results are also similar if state fixed-effects 
are included in the regressions.  
 
First, in order to ensure that the results are not driven by extreme values and outliers, SRISK 
is winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles, and then the regression is re-estimated using this 
winsorized variable. As can be seen from the column 1 of table 10, the estimation result is 
consistent with the main empirical finding, suggesting that the result is not driven by outliers.  
 
Second, in order to make sure that the finding is not driven by distressed banks in the sample, 
a dummy variable is added to the regression (Failedbank) where it takes the value 1 for either 
failed banks or the banks which have been taken over during the sample period and zero 
otherwise. Equation 21 is employed to examine whether the main finding is caused by failed 
banks. Again, the estimate of this regression is similar to the main empirical finding as shown 
in the column 2 of table 10.  
 
(21)  SRISK𝒊𝒕 = α + β1𝐿𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + β2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + β3 𝐿𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1 + β4𝐷𝑡𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 +
β5𝑁𝑂𝑁 − 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + β6𝑁𝑂𝑁 − 𝑃𝑅𝐹𝑀𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿0 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠 + ∑ 𝛾𝑡𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡
2014
𝑡=2001 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
In the third and fourth robustness tests, longer time lags are included in the main regression 
(equation 20) to examine whether the main result is sensitive to the number of lags chosen. 
The column 3 of table 10 shows the model with second lags while model 4 shows the result 
for estimating the regression with third lags. This robustness check is important because it 
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shows that liquidity creation can be employed as an early warning indictor. The estimations 
of the regressions with the longer time lags are similar to the main finding. 
 
In the fifth robustness check, an alternative regression specification is modeled to further 
examine the robustness of the main result. As can be seen from the column 5 of table 10, the 
estimation of this model specification (equation 22) is once again consistent with the main 
fining, suggesting that high liquidity creation has a positive contribution to systemic risk. 
The alternative regression is modeled as of the following form: 
 
(22) ∆𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 = ∆𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑡 + β2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + β3 𝐿𝐺𝑖𝑡 + β4𝐷𝑡𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + β5𝑁𝑂𝑁 − 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 +
β6𝑁𝑂𝑁 − 𝑃𝑅𝐹𝑀𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖
𝑛−1
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑡𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡
2014
𝑡=2001 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
where ∆ is the difference in the variable between time t-1 and t. This model specification 
tests whether the changes in SRISK from year t-1 to t is influenced by the changes in liquidity 
creation measure. The reason why SRISK, LC and LG are considered at current time (at time 
t) instead of one period lagged values is that employing delta automatically considers the 
difference between t-1 and t. In other words, there is no need to use first lagged values of 
SRISK, LC and LG, because t-1 is embedded in the delta operator. However, one lagged 
values of other variables are used in this alternative model specification because these 
variables are just a ratio.  
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Table 10. Robustness check. 
The table reports the robustness check results of the panel regression model which is applied to a 
sample of 26 large US banks that spans from 2000 to 2014. Column 1 contains the result based on 
winsorized systemic risk measure. Column 2 contains the result when failed banks taken into 
consideration. Column 3 and 4 contain the results based on longer time lags. Column 5 reports the 
estimation of an alternative regression specification. The results correspond to the estimated 
coefficient and the t-statistics (in parentheses) that are based on robust standard errors, which are 
adjusted for heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance level of 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively. 
 
Variable         Model 1         Model 2        Model 3         Model 4        Model 5 
Liquidity creation variable:     
LC.catfat 0.073*** 0.084*** 0.105*** 0.131*** 0.104** 
  (4.60) (3.56) (3.77) (3.53) (2.41) 
Control variables:      
DtA -29.111 -30.882 -35.767 -31.476 -21.91** 
  (1.42) (-1.31) (-1.47) (-1.53) (-2.18) 
ROA -219.472 -203.131 -239.502 -293.913 -109.60* 
  (-1.17) (-1.07) (-0.98) (-1.54) (-1.74) 
LG -0.015 -0.033 -0.036 -0.025 -0.022 
  (-0.76) (-1.33) (-1.57) (-1.06) (-1.36) 
NON-INTI 0.198*** 0.191*** 0.192*** 0.184*** 0.039 
  (4.26) (3.91) (4.88) (4.53) (1.44) 
NON-PRFML 2.405*** 2.851*** 2.021 2.462 -0.117 
  (2.83) (2.78) (1.49) (0.85) (-0.49) 
Constant 11.575 13.254 16.984 13.511 17.701* 
  (0.70) (0.63) (0.80) (0.75) (1.73) 
       
Bank size fixed-effect Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
No. of obs 313 313 288 263 314 
Ajusted R-square 0.456 0.382 0.402 0.486 0.252 
F-stats 13.45*** 10.65*** 10.63*** 12.11*** 6.02*** 
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12. CONCLUSION  
 
The recent global financial crisis showed how oversized balance sheet in the banking sector, 
probably caused by lax lending standards, not only causes severe damage to the system, but 
it also triggers financial instability. In addition, the recent financial meltdown highlighted the 
importance of bank’s off-balance sheet activities which mostly occurred through 
securitization process in shadow banking system. These activities deviate banks from 
traditional banking system and emphasize the importance of off-balance sheet liquidity 
created by banks.  
 
This study focuses on bank liquidity creation as one of the core activities of commercial 
banks which has enormously increased in the past few years. According to liquidity creation 
theory, banks indeed not only create liquidity on their balance sheet, but they also create it 
off their balance sheet. Thereby, bank’s on and off balance sheet activities are indispensable 
components. This study focuses on liquidity creation because it is also an important factor 
for macro-economy. However, too much creation of liquidity is not always beneficial for the 
economy, and sometimes it may cause financial fragility. Therefore, the aim of this study is 
to examine whether high total liquidity creation has a positive contribution to the level of 
systemic risk. 
 
Using one of the prominent measures of systemic risk proposed by Bownless and Engle 
(2011), and a comprehensive measure of liquidity creation developed by Berger and 
Bouwman (2009), this study finds that high liquidity provision contributes positively to 
systemic risk.  The results also show that the effect of liquidity creation during the financial 
crisis is stronger. Furthermore, after liquidity creation breakout, the empirical analysis further 
finds that although the impact of on balance sheet liquidity creation is smaller than the effect 
of off balance sheet liquidity creation on systemic risk during the 2008 financial crisis, 
systemic risk is not generally influenced by on balance sheet liquidity creation. This result 
acknowledges that the main finding is primarily driven by off balance sheet liquidity creation. 
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The findings in this study offer several important implications. First, high liquidity creation 
not only increases bank risk-taking and probability of bank failure as documented in previous 
studies, but it also contributes positively to systemic risk. Second, since high liquidity 
provision creates negative externalities for both financial system and real economy, 
regulators and supervisors should pay more attention to high liquidity creators as they can 
positively contribute to systemic risk. The results also demonstrate that when banks create 
high liquidity, they actually make themselves illiquid which may raise the probability of bank 
failure and cause a cost not only to the real economy, but cause also a cost to taxpayers.  The 
results further demonstrate that high liquidity creators take on more risk when the external 
cost is not internalized. By even incorporating liquidity creation in taxation policy, high 
liquidity creators can not only internalize their systemic risk to the rest of economy, but they 
can minimize taxpayer losses.   
 
Finally, the findings also convey a clear signal to regulators and supervisors about bank 
lending behavior and bank degree of leverage.  This information also helps regulators to 
constrain the buildup of excessive risk in commercial banks before it is too late. In addition, 
a linkage between liquidity creation and systemic risk can be seen as an early warning 
indicator for commercial banks. If banks, on the one hand, rely on lending excessively, and 
on the other hand if their loan portfolio grows faster than their liabilities (financing illiquid 
asset with liquid liabilities grows), that would lead to higher bank illiquidity and more risk. 
This issue was seen clearly before the crisis when there was no regulation and supervisory 
about bank liquidity. 
 
Although this study has several implications, it also has a limitation. The sample used in this 
analysis is relatively small and it only accounts for 26 large US commercial banks which can 
constrain the generalizability of the results. Hence, future research can focus on extending 
the dataset to a larger sample size for more concise analysis. In this regard, small, other large 
US commercial banks as well as international banks can also be included in the analysis. 
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APPENDIX 1. Correlation between bank size and liquidity creation 
 
This study uses a modified firm fixed-effects due to potential multicollinearity problem. 
Instead of using logarithm of total assets (logTA) as a proxy for size, this study sorts all banks 
with respect to the average total assets over the sample period into three deciles as discussed 
throughout the study. In this section, the correlation matrix is reported to show the correlation 
between size variable (logTA) and liquidity creation measure (LC.catfat). As can be seen 
from correlation matrix, logTA is strongly positively correlated (75%) with the variable of 
interest, namely, LC.catfat. Since this study accounts for large US banks, a strong correlation 
between LC.catfat and the size variable could be due to the fact that liquidity creation is 
mostly generated by large banks as documented by Beregr and Bouwman (2010). 
 
 LC.catfat      LogTA      ROA NON_INTI NON_PRFML         LG      DtA 
SRISK 0.48 0.45 -0.21 0.04 0.44 -0.07 -0.09 
LC.catfat 1.00 0.75 -0.03 -0.07 0.26 -0.03 -0.15 
LogTA  1.00 -0.19 0.10 0.31 -0.09 -0.25 
ROA   1.00 0.24 -0.38 -0.13 -0.20 
NON_INTI    1.00 -0.08 -0.11 -0.20 
NON_PRFML    1.00 -0.05 -0.08 
LG      1.00 0.01 
DtA       1.00 
 
